THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION: SHOULD DIFFERENCES IN A STATE’S POLITICAL HISTORY AND CULTURE MATTER?

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2010, in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, the United States Supreme Court struck down federal limits on independent corporate campaign expenditures. In a deeply divided decision, the Court ruled that such limitations cut at the heart of political discourse and were therefore unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds.

One year later, in *Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General of Montana*, the Montana Supreme Court faced a parallel First Amendment challenge against a state law restricting independent corporate campaign expenditures. Unlike the United States Supreme Court in *Citizens United*, however, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the independent corporate expenditure limitation. The rationale that the Montana Supreme Court offered in distinguishing *Citizens United* can be summarized in three words: “Montana is different.” According to the Montana Supreme Court, Montana’s history and political culture were such that the state’s rationale in restricting corporate expenditure constituted a compelling state interest even if there was no compelling interest justifying prohibiting independent corporate campaign expenditures at the federal level.

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2. Id. at 913 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
3. Id. at 913.
5. Id. at 18 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 13–35–227(1)).
7. Id. at 6 (“[U]nlike *Citizens United*, this case concerns Montana law, Montana elections and it arises from Montana history.”).
8. Id. at 9 (“[In the early 1900s,] naked corporate manipulation of the very government (Governor and Legislature) of the State ultimately resulted in populist reforms that are still part of Montana law.”).
9. Id. at 11 (“Issues of corporate influence, sparse population, dependence upon agriculture and extractive resource development, location as a transportation corridor, and low campaign costs make Montana especially vulnerable to continued efforts of corporate control to the detriment of democracy and the republican form of government.”) (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 13.
The Montana Court’s decision was short-lived. The case was appealed, and the United States Supreme Court summarily reversed. In a terse 5–4 decision, the Court announced simply, “The question presented in this case is whether the holding of *Citizens United* applies to the Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does.”

The United States Supreme Court decision, however, did not engage the Montana Supreme Court’s reasoning, stating only that the state court “fail[ed] to meaningfully distinguish” *Citizens United*. The Court thus left unexplained why it was not persuaded by the state court’s rationale that Montana’s political culture and history justified a different result with respect to the state’s campaign limits than the Court reached in *Citizens United* with respect to federal limitations.

This essay directly responds to the Montana Court’s assertion. Part II examines and expands upon the Montana Supreme Court’s claim that Montana is different. It suggests that not only was the state court correct in its assessment of Montana but in fact all states are “different” in the sense that all states have unique political cultures. Part III reviews the effects of federal statutory and constitutional law in shaping the political cultures of the states, noting that in some circumstances federal law has dramatically affected the states’ political cultures but that in other areas the states have been relatively free to develop and sustain their internal political cultures without federal interference. The section ends by raising the question of whether campaign finance rules are ones that should generally be federalized or whether they constitute the types of regulations that should be left to the states. Part IV responds to this question by offering the normative suggestion that, given the differences between the states’ political cultures, it makes sense that campaign finance rules vary from state to state. Part V addresses the difficult question of constitutionality: do the differences among the states, and between the states and the federal government, support different results on the legality of campaign finance restrictions under the First Amendment? Is it constitutionally permissible that a campaign finance regulation that is found unconstitutional in one state be somehow upheld in another? Part VI briefly raises the question of whether recent

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12. *Id.*
13. *Id.*
14. Even the four Justices dissenting from the Court’s summary reversal did not accept the Montana Court’s reasoning on its own terms. The dissent argued only that the state court’s conclusion that the state had a compelling state interest in regulating corporate campaign contributions indicated that *Citizens United* was wrongly decided and should therefore be revisited. The dissent did not address the state court’s contention that Montana’s corporate restrictions could be distinguished from the federal limitations because of the state’s particular political culture and history. *Id.* at 2491–2492 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
developments in the nationalization of American politics means that preserving the states’ political cultures is no longer a valid concern. Part VII offers a short conclusion.

II. ARE THE STATES DIFFERENT?

As noted above, the central assertion of the Montana Supreme Court in distinguishing *Citizens United* was that Montana is different. The Montana Court was right. Montana is different. Part of this, as the state court explained, is based in history. The mining industry that dominated Montana’s economy for so many years also produced the so-called Copper Kings who, in turn, dominated the State’s political system.

Montana is also “different” because of other factors. Contrast Montana, for example, with the state of California. Montana’s population is approximately one million people. California’s population is thirty-eight million. Think of what this disparity in population means in terms of how expensive it is to run a statewide campaign. The last (2010) gubernatorial race in California, for example, cost over $250 million. The 2008 election in Montana, by comparison, cost $2.5 million. A statewide candidate in California, consequently, has to raise and spend more money in order to be competitive and, unless she is extraordinarily independently wealthy, spend considerably more time and energy soliciting contributions than her Montana counterpart.

The disparity in population also leads to differences in the type of campaigning done by the candidates. In California, the race has to center

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15. *W. Tradition Partn., Inc.*, 271 P.3d at 11 (“[W]hen the statute in question was enacted[,] the State of Montana and its government were operating under a mere shell of legal authority, and the real social and political power was wielded by powerful corporate managers to further their own business interests. The voters had more than enough . . . .”).
16. *Id.* at 8–9. *See also Larry Howell, Once Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United, Caperton, and the War of the Copper Kings*, 73 Mont. L. Rev. 25 (2012).
primarily in the airwaves. There is no way that a statewide candidate can reach a significant portion of the electorate by grassroots activities such as personal appearances, town hall meetings, or door-to-door campaigning. In Montana, on the other hand, face-to-face grassroots campaigning is not only possible, it is expected.

The differences between the two states may have as much or even greater effect on elections for more local races. The sizes of Montana’s and California’s statehouses, for example, are roughly equivalent. Montana has 50 state senators and 100 state representatives, while California’s numbers are 40 and 80 respectively. But consider what the disparity in population between the two states means in its practical effect in a state legislative race. In Montana there is a state senator for every 20,000 persons while in California there is a state senator for every 1 million persons. A million dollar state senate campaign in California consequently means that only $1 is spent per citizen. A million dollar state race in Montana means that $50 has been spent for each citizen.

And Montana is not the only state that is different. New Hampshire, for example, has a population of only 1.3 million, but it has 400 members in its House of Representatives—or one representative for only 3,250 people. That means statehouse politics in New Hampshire are far more localized than in a more sparsely populated state like Montana. And it means a one million dollar house race constitutes an expenditure of $285 per citizen.

Nebraska, meanwhile, has its own unique political landscape, occasioned by the fact that it has a unicameral legislature whose members are elected on a nonpartisan basis. This changes both how campaigns are waged and how much power a legislator has once elected. In Nebraska, for example, an individual need not have party backing in order to become nominated or elected to the statehouse, and an individual legislator has as


22. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 10–11 (“Montana, with its small population, enjoys political campaigns marked by person-to-person contact and a low cost of advertising compared to other states. . . . The dynamic of local Montana political office races . . . has historically been characterized by the low-dollar, broad-based campaigns run by Montana candidates.”).


24. Id. at 55.


27. Id. at 311.
much power as any other, regardless of party, to introduce new legislation for consideration by the legislature as a whole.  

The location of media markets can also have a dramatic effect on elections. New Jersey has a population similar to that of Georgia and Michigan, but statewide campaigns in that state are much more expensive because candidates in New Jersey have to advertise in the very expensive media markets of New York City and Philadelphia. Georgia and Michigan, in contrast, are dominated by only one media market.

Population, the number and kind of legislative districts, and the location of media markets are only some of the variables that affect the nature and substance of political campaigns. A state’s political traditions and history, as the Montana State Supreme Court realized, can have an enormous effect on how campaigns are run and how campaigns are perceived by the voters. Maine, for example, has a tradition of electing independent candidates that gives those waging a campaign outside of traditional party structures greater chances of winning than in most other states.


32. W. Tradition Partn., Inc., 271 P.3d at 10 (noting one Montana politician’s observation that “voters were concerned that they ‘didn’t really count’ in the political process unless they can make a material financial contribution . . . .”).

33. In the 1994 and 1998 elections, Maine elected independent Angus King governor, and in 1974, it elected independent James Longley. In the 2010 gubernatorial election, Mainer’s very nearly elected independent Eliot Cutler (Cutler garnered 36% of the vote while Republican Paul LePage, the eventual winner, garnered 38%). Michael Barone & Chuck McCutcheon, The Almanac of American Politics 2012 717 (U. Chicago Press 2011).
soliciting and raising money from out-of-state contributors can be a political liability, but in others it is not as much of a concern.

Numerous other factors also lead to divergences in political cultures among the states. Demography is one major reason, as race, religion, and economic status each have profound effects on voting patterns. Political rules are another. Term limits, for example, force turnover in political offices, arguably creating a culture with less political entrenchment and more people ready to directly participate in government by running for office. A state that elects its judges may view the judiciary more politically than those states whose judges are appointed. Even a state’s geography can play a significant role in how a state conducts its politics. Montana and Rhode Island may have roughly equivalent populations, but the sheer size of Montana means that statewide in-person campaigning will be more ardu-

34. For example, the governor of Wisconsin recently faced sharp criticism and national attention for the vast sums he received from out-of-state contributors in the state’s gubernatorial recall election in June 2012. See e.g. Claire O’Connor, Gov. Scott Walker’s Big Money Backers Include 13 Out-Of-State Billionaires, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/claireoconnor/2012/06/05/gov-scott-walkers-big-money-backers-include-13-out-of-state-billionaires/ (June 5, 2012).


36. See Malcolm E. Jewell & Sarah M. Morehouse, Political Parties and Elections in American States 12 (4th ed., CQ Press 2001) (noting that distributions of people of different races, religions, or socioeconomic status within a particular constituency can have important consequences on local political culture, at least with respect to issues on which those groups are divergent).


ous, expensive, and time consuming than in Rhode Island, where the candidate has far less ground to cover. Campaign strategies therefore are adjusted accordingly.

All states, then, are different; not just Montana. That difference, moreover, is significant even beyond the quantitative factors of population, demography, size of the legislature, and media costs noted above. Each state has, what political scientists term, its own “political culture” formed in part by custom and tradition as well as by some of the more quantitative measures noted above. And as that political science literature further explains, those differences are deep and have substantial consequences.

qfd/states/44000.html (accessed Oct. 13, 2012) (reporting Rhode Island’s population to be just over one million).


Second, the chief executive officer, the President, is not elected on the basis of the most votes that he or she receives, as in the states, but rather on the basis of his or her winning a majority of votes in the Electoral College—a structure that leads to campaign strategies being centered on winning “swing states” rather than on more general appeals to the nation as a whole. See George Rabinowitz & Stuart Elaine MacDonald, The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 65, 80 (1986) (demonstrating that voters in certain states are over 20 times more likely to determine the outcome of a presidential election).

Third, one branch of the national legislature, the United States Senate, is not equally proportioned (unlike any of the states) meaning that federal legislative power is disproportionately concentrated in representatives from states with smaller populations.


42. Daniel Elazar’s influential framework placed each of the states into three categories of governmental culture: (1) moralistic culture, where government is a legitimizing instrument for promoting public welfare—best characterized by the Puritan establishments in New England; (2) individualistic culture, which is marked by a preference for limited government and religious tolerance—best characterized by the Quaker settlements in the middle states; and (3) traditionalistic culture, where government was the means of maintaining existing order—best characterized by the governments of the South, which adopted many of the norms of European landed gentry. Daniel Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States 86–94 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1966).

43. Political cultures affect political structures by defining the way those structures are evaluated. In other words, a constituency’s values, as shown through its political culture, determines how that society structures government to best accommodate those values and also defines the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of those structures. See Koven & Mausolff, supra n. 41, at 67.

There is finally one further nuance to consider in examining the differences between the states: some of the differences in political culture between the states may express very different views of democratic theory. As the political scientist Robert Dahl once explained, there is no one theory for democracy.\textsuperscript{45} And there is no better evidence of Dahl’s assertion than taking a look at the quilt of the divergent democracies that are the states; indeed, each state appears to express its own theory of democracy.\textsuperscript{46}

Most states, for example, have independent attorneys general,\textsuperscript{47} expressing a political theory that democracy is best served by diluting executive power and having checks on its exercise from within the executive branch—\textsuperscript{48} a theory that is different from those of the states (and the federal government) that allow the governor (or president) to remove an attorney general at her discretion.\textsuperscript{49} Other states take this model of the divided executive even further—providing independence to a wide range of executive officers including secretaries of state, treasurers, and auditors, among other state officers.\textsuperscript{50}

The divided executive is just one of many examples. The states that elect judges reflect a different vision of the independence and accountability of the judiciary in a democracy than those whose judges are appointed.\textsuperscript{51}
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States that allow voters to directly enact or approve laws by the initiative and referendum process signal a far different view of democracy than states that allow laws to be passed only by representatives. The list goes on. The question is: should these different political cultures and the different political theories that they may represent lead to a different set of election rules?

III. THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL LAW ON THE STATES’ POLITICAL CULTURES

Because each state has its own political culture, it is not surprising that each state also has its own unique set of laws and constitutional provisions governing its political processes. In fact, it may very well be that a state’s rules governing its political processes have as much role in forming a state’s political culture as the political culture has in forming the state’s governing rules. But whichever is the cart and whichever is the horse, there is no doubt that governing rules differ considerably from state to state.

This is not to say the states are free to develop their rules and maintain their political cultures without external constraints. Federal structures also play a significant role. The Constitution, both in its original form and as amended, places specific and considerable limitations on how a state can structure its politics. Congress also has been a force in re-ordering the states’ internal politics. From the Reapportionment Act of 1842 requiring that the states use single member districts in electing members to the House of Representatives, through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protecting the

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rights of minority voters and guarding against racial gerrymandering,\(^{58}\) to the more recently enacted Help America Vote Act reaching into the technicalities of election administration,\(^{59}\) Congress has at times enacted significant and far reaching legislation affecting the states’ internal political climates.

And, of course, United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting broad constitutional guarantees such as the Equal Protection Clause and Free Speech Clause have also had profound effects on the states’ political cultures.\(^{60}\) The political patronage cases virtually rewrote the way that some states conducted their political business and weakened the roles of what had been powerful party machines.\(^{61}\) The White Primary Cases\(^{62}\) broke open the political parties’ internal processes of nominating candidates. The decision in *Republican Party of Minnesota v. White*\(^ {63}\) fundamentally changed the way judicial elections are conducted.\(^ {64}\) And *Dunn v. Blumstein*\(^ {65}\) directly addressed, and dismissed, the right of the state to attempt to insulate its political culture from those who might not be familiar with it.\(^ {66}\) In *Blumstein*, the state asserted that voter residency requirements were necessary to assure that newly-arrived voters had experience with a state’s political culture before exercising the franchise, but the Court found that rationale insufficient to sustain the regulations.\(^ {67}\)

The most dramatic example of a Supreme Court decision changing a state’s political culture is undoubtedly *Reynolds v. Sims*\(^ {68}\) requiring states to apportion the branches of their legislature according to the principle of one person, one vote.\(^ {69}\) The *Reynolds* decision fundamentally changed state government, immediately moving centers of political power from rural ar-

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66. *Id.* at 331–333 (striking down duration residency requirements for voting).
67. *Id.* at 360.
69. *Id.* at 567–568. *Reynolds* did not actually use the phrase “one person, one vote.” Instead, the language stems from *Gray v. Sanders*, where the Court stated: “The conception of political equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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eas into the cities. 70  And while the decision has been widely praised as necessary to counter legislative entrenchment and the reality that elected officials will seldom adopt reforms that threaten their own political viability, 71 the Court, it should be remembered, also applied one person, one vote in Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 72 where legislative entrenchment was not at issue. In Lucas, the state of Colorado approved a system of unequal apportionment for its state senate through voter initiative, indicating that the citizens desired to have a political system in place that reinforced regional representation over and above simple equi-population apportionment concerns. 73 As Justice Stewart argued in dissent, the Court arguably “convert[ed] a particular political philosophy into a constitutional rule.” 74

Nevertheless, for every example of federal judicial interference in a state’s internal political culture there are counterexamples in which the states have been left to develop and maintain their own political cultures without federal interference. 75 In Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph


71. See e.g. David Strauss, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1251, 1260–1261 (noting the importance of Reynolds for overcoming legislative entrenchment).


73. See id. at 717–718.

74. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

75. Some of the Court’s decisions leaving the states alone, of course, can be subject to considerable criticism. Giles v. Harris, for example, is a particularly ignominious decision in which the Court, per Justice Holmes, refused to act in facing a Fifteenth Amendment challenge to a state that refused to register African-Americans. 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903). Although Justice Holmes’s opinion apparently recognized that a constitutional violation may have occurred, he refused to intervene, claiming it was beyond the Court’s power to assure that any remedy it might offer could be judicially enforced. Id. at 487 (“We express no opinion as to the . . . unconstitutionality beyond saying that we are not willing to assume that they are valid.”).

Another such example is Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove v. Green where the Court turned down a challenge to mal-apportionment under the Guaranty Clause because, in its words, it wanted to avoid entering into the “political thicket” of reapportionment. 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). See also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 47 (1849) (refusing to examine which one of two political factions, after competing elections, was entitled to lay claim to lead the state government of Rhode Island, even though the basis of one side’s position was that the other had been chosen by an electorate composed of only 40% of the free white male population).

The Court, of course, eventually moved on from Giles and Colegrove. The Court abandoned Giles when it began to address racial discrimination in voting rights cases. See e.g. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). And in Baker v. Carr, the Court reversed the result in Colegrove and entered into the “political thicket” by bypassing the Guaranty Clause and holding that apportionment cases were justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–210 (1962).

Some, of course, might cite Gomillon and Baker (and by negative example, Giles and Colegrove) for the proposition that the Court should more actively intervene into the states’ internal political cultures. But while the Court’s intervention in Gomillon and Baker may be uncontroversial, there are counterexamples where judicial involvement may not have been so beneficial. See e.g. Republican
v. Oregon, for example, the Court, in a very far-reaching decision affecting a state’s political culture, refused to intervene to determine whether the “direct democracy” processes of initiative and referendum were constitutionally permissible. In other cases, the Court has left undisturbed state rules governing ballot access, write-in candidacies, open primary systems, and measures that serve to protect the two-party system. It has upheld even the most partisan methods of reapportionment and redistricting. And while the Court has struck down state-imposed term limits for members of Congress, it has signaled that it would not question the constitutionality of term limits for state elected officials.

Campaign finance is the last piece of this puzzle. To what extent should campaign finance rules be left to the states and to what extent should campaign finance rules be federalized either through Congressional enactment or judicial decision?

Obviously, there has already been considerable movement on this question. In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress took a lead in federalizing campaign finance rules (at least as applied to elections for federal officers) when it passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 and its amendments in 1974. And it has continued to act in this area most notably in its passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. The Court has also played an active role in federalizing campaign finance law, not only by the precedential effects of its First Amendment decisions striking down federal campaign finance restrictions, but also more directly in invalidating, among other measures, state campaign contribution limits and state measures designed to encourage candidates to participate in state

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76. Pac. Sts. Tel. & Telegraph Co. v. Or., 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
77. Id. at 150–151.
public financing schemes.\textsuperscript{89} \textit{Citizens United} and \textit{American Tradition Partnership}\textsuperscript{90} are just the latest efforts in this area. The Montana Court’s decision in \textit{Western Tradition Partnership}, however, suggests that at least for some the question of whether such federalization is advisable remains unresolved.

IV. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DEVOIDING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

A number of years ago, prior to the Court’s decision in \textit{Citizens United}, I wrote an article suggesting that campaign finance laws governing federal elections be devolved to the states.\textsuperscript{91} In part, I based this argument on the fact, discussed above, that states have very different political cultures;\textsuperscript{92} and that money, in particular, plays a much different role in large media-driven states like California than in smaller more grassroots states like New Hampshire or Montana.\textsuperscript{93} I therefore suggested that it might make sense for different states to have different campaign finance rules because the political dynamics of the states were so dramatically different.

I supported this claim for devolution with other rationales. First, I asserted that devolving campaign finance to the states would lessen some of the problems in legislative entrenchment that occur when elected officials are permitted to enact the rules that affect their own chances of re-election.\textsuperscript{94} Having the states set forth the campaign finance rules governing the election of federal officials would not rid the problems of legislative entrenchment entirely—state legislators might still be motivated to pass laws they believe would benefit their own political party—but there would at least be some space between those making the decisions and those most directly affected by them.\textsuperscript{95}

Second, I argued that devolving campaign finance laws to the states might help ameliorate some of the unintended consequences that inevitably arise from campaign finance regulation.\textsuperscript{96} One of the problems with cam-


\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Am. Tradition Partn.}, 132 S. Ct. 2490.


\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Id.} at 383–384 (“[D]ifferences in the role of money and politics may be based on political tradition. Corporations and labor unions have historically been more active in Michigan than in Oregon. Political parties have historically been more powerful in Illinois than in Nevada.”).

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Id.} at 383.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Id.} at 380.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Id.} at 377–379.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Id.} at 379–380.
campaign finance reform is that some of its efforts unintentionally backfire.\textsuperscript{97} Enacting campaign finance reform at the state level would localize, and therefore lessen, any adverse effects.\textsuperscript{98}

Third, I contended that devolution in this area was advisable as “it would allow the integration of campaign finance with other state campaign and election law” that affect funding issues.\textsuperscript{99} The cost of elections depends in part on the rules governing those elections. It is more expensive, for example, to run for office in a state in which candidates are chosen by primaries than it is to run in states in which candidates are chosen by internal party procedures; the former generally requires significant expenditures to directly reach voters while the latter requires reaching out to only relatively few decision-makers.\textsuperscript{100} Allowing states to adjust their campaign finance rules to reflect such realities would both assist the states in enacting legislation that corresponds to their other laws governing elections and perhaps encourage the states to more thoroughly analyze proposed election laws through the lens of its effects on campaign funding issues.\textsuperscript{101}

Fourth, I suggested that devolution might increase citizen participation in the political process.\textsuperscript{102} In so arguing, I relied upon Justice O’Connor’s observation that “federalism enhances the opportunity of all citizens to participate in representative government” by bringing the locus of political decision-making closer to the people.\textsuperscript{103} Decentralizing campaign finance therefore would allow citizens to more closely participate in formulating the rules that affect citizen participation itself.

Finally, I argued that decentralization would allow for much needed experimentation in ways to address the issues raised by the influence or over-influence of money in politics.\textsuperscript{104} In that light, I contended the rationale offered by Justice Brandeis in \textit{New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann}\textsuperscript{105} that states should serve as laboratories for “experimentation in things social and

\textsuperscript{97}. See Marshall, \textit{supra} n. 91, at 342. Contribution limitations, for example, have diverted funds from candidates to independent expenditure groups leading to a scenario in which political ads are run without any accountability. At least when the candidate ran the ad, there was the possibility that she would face political backlash if the ad was untruthful or in bad taste. Now the candidate is not politically accountable for such ads because she is not directly responsible for them.

\textsuperscript{98}. Id. at 379.

\textsuperscript{99}. Id. at 381.

\textsuperscript{100}. Id. at 357.

\textsuperscript{101}. Id. at 381.

\textsuperscript{102}. Id. at 383.


\textsuperscript{104}. Marshall, \textit{supra} n. 91, at 384.

economically" was particularly well-suited to campaign finance reform because the stakes underlying the campaign finance project were so high and the risks and possibilities of error were so great. Moreover, unlike economic or social problems that do not automatically stop at a state’s borders, political cultures do. The problems addressed by regulations of the political process are truly state bound.

To these rationales, Professor Anthony Johnstone has offered another powerful reason: federalism. Decentralization of campaign finance rules (and other rules governing the political process), he argues, serves the value of federalism by allowing states both to increase political accountability and flexibility and reduce the power of interest group entrenchment at the federal level. As such, protecting the states’ political cultures serves to both promote democratic experimentation and diffuse political power in a way that the homogenization of the states’ political systems would not. Further, as Johnstone explains, decentralization also allows the states to develop their own visions of what constitutes a “Republican form of government,” an issue on which there is no national consensus.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Not surprisingly, despite its possible merits, the suggestion that campaign finance rules be devolved to the states never gained traction as a possible reform. In fact, it is likely an overstatement to claim that the thesis caused even a ripple in the campaign finance reform debate. Western Tradition Partnership, however, once again brings to the fore the question of whether campaign finance regulation is best accomplished at the state level. But the issue now is not whether such an approach is advisable from a policy perspective but rather whether such an approach is constitutional given the Court’s First Amendment rulings on national campaign finance legislation. This section examines that issue.

106. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
108. See supra nn. 40–43 and accompanying text.
109. Johnstone, supra n. 54.
110. Id.
112. Johnstone, supra n. 54.
113. In offering devolution as a possible approach to campaign finance regulation, I was careful not to overstate its political viability. Public choice theory suggests that members of Congress might not want to entrust to state legislative bodies the power to make rules that would affect their own chances for re-election. See Marshall, supra n. 91, at 377–379.
A. Greater Deference to State Campaign Finance Laws?

One possible argument is that the Court should less rigorously review state campaign finance laws under the First Amendment than it does national legislation. I rejected that suggestion in my earlier piece, however, and continue to be wary of it here. The Court has never, to my knowledge, treated state laws more leniently than federal laws, and, if anything, it has, from time to time, seemed more inclined to act in the other direction and be more receptive to upholding federal laws than upholding those laws’ state counterparts.115

The idea that state legislation should be reviewed more deferentially than federal legislation under the First Amendment is controversial. As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously remarked, “I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”116

The position that state campaign finance laws should be more leniently reviewed than their federal counterparts, however, has some support. Justice Jackson, for example, raised such a possibility in his dissenting opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois,117 when he argued that states should have more latitude under the First Amendment than the federal government in enacting group libel laws.118 Justice Harlan made a similar point in his dissents in obscenity cases,119 contending that legislative experimentation at the state level was needed with respect to obscenity regulation because the issues


118. Id. at 294–295 (Jackson, J. dissenting).

were so difficult—a rationale that also applies to campaign finance. And perhaps most importantly for our purposes, Justice Rehnquist made the argument directly in the context of campaign finance regulation, when, expressly relying on Justices Jackson and Harlan, he wrote, “that not all of the strictures which the First Amendment imposes upon Congress are carried over against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Nevertheless, there are strong arguments for not diluting First Amendment doctrine in its application to state campaign finance laws as opposed to its application to federal campaign finance laws. First and most broadly, the position that state laws in any area be more deferentially reviewed than federal laws is problematic on a number of counts. To begin with, the numerous checks in the federal legislative process serve better to protect constitutional rights than do state legislative processes, which are generally more subject to capture. Further, the size and scope of the federal government also work to better insulate the Congress from the pressures to undercut constitutional guarantees than occurs at the state level. For these reasons, many have persuasively argued that, if anything, judicial review should be less deferential when applied to state enactments than when applied to federal. Second, and more specifically, campaign finance regulations operate in an area in which judicial review is particularly warranted. The problem of political self-dealing, even if it is tempered by decentralization, argues strongly against an added layer of deference based on the locus of the regulatory decision-maker. Finally, as Buckley v. Valeo holds, campaign finance regulation affects activity at the core of the First Amendment. Although there may be an argument, as Professors Schauer and Pildes maintain, that the Court should carve out a category of

120. See supra Section IV.
122. See Choper, supra n. 116, at 1584–1585 (“On states [sic] rights matters, the people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress”; Congress is thus ‘subject to political restraints which can be counted on to prevent abuse.’ But state and local legislatures contain no representatives of the central government or of those persons outside the jurisdiction upon whom the weight of the local laws may fall. . . . [T]he force of special interest groups is markedly greater in local legislative bodies than in the federal political process . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
123. See e.g. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10 64 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet 1961) (“The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”). See also Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 269, 276 (1993) (“[I]t is highly likely that the institutions of a large, national federation will in many ways be better decision-makers than the institutions of small, relatively more homogenous entities such as the states.”).
124. See Choper, supra n. 116; Calabresi, supra n. 123.
126. Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
127. Id. at 14–15.
election speech for more deferential regulation than speech in other areas,\textsuperscript{128} that argument applies to the treatment of election speech generally and does not distinguish between state and federal regulators.

\subsection*{B. Differences among the States}

The more substantial constitutional argument is the one offered by the Montana Supreme Court—that the political culture of a particular state can serve as a compelling state interest justifying campaign finance regulation even if the political cultures in other states might not be sufficiently compelling.\textsuperscript{129} Under this approach, the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions could vary from state to state even if the campaign finance restriction in question is exactly the same. That is, a provision such as a restriction on corporate campaign contributions might be permissible in one state and invalid in another, depending upon that state’s political culture.

It is, of course, at least awkward that something like a restriction on corporate contributions could be deemed permissible under the First Amendment in Montana yet an exactly parallel provision be unconstitutional in New York. Such a result, however, is not incompatible with constitutional doctrine. The compelling interest test,\textsuperscript{130} under which restrictions upon First Amendment rights are measured, requires a balancing between the speech right at stake and the strength of the state’s interest. And although strict scrutiny demands a particularly strong state interest in order for a challenged provision to survive, strict scrutiny does not mean “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact” as Gerald Gunther once asserted.\textsuperscript{131} Rather, as Adam Winkler has documented, many laws can, and do, survive the strict scrutiny inquiry.\textsuperscript{132} Thus, even if corporate speech rights are constant no matter where the location, it is certainly possible that Montana could have a greater interest in limiting corporate contributions than New York does and that Montana’s interest could therefore be considered compelling even if New York’s is not. The real question is the extent that the Court would be willing to tailor its application of the compelling interest test to the political cultures of each specific state in this manner.\textsuperscript{133}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{129} \textit{W. Tradition Partn., Inc.}, 271 P.3d at 235–236.
\bibitem{130} \textit{E.g. Citizens United}, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” (citations omitted)).
\bibitem{132} See Winkler, supra n. 115, at 795–796, 822.
\bibitem{133} For an argument that courts should tailor the application of constitutional tests to the level of government involved, see Mark D. Rosen, \textit{The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional
In this regard it is notable that there is some non-judicial precedent for treating the states differently on account of political culture. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), \textsuperscript{134} in particular, varies its coverage of the states based upon the latters’ history and culture of racial discrimination. \textsuperscript{135} Under Section 5, states that are considered "covered jurisdictions," because of factors indicating a history and culture of racial discrimination, must seek "preclearance" from either U.S. District Court or the Department of Justice if they initiate changes to their voting rules or procedure (including redistricting and reapportionment). \textsuperscript{136} Non-covered states, however, are exempt from such requirements. Thus it could be argued that if a state’s political culture can be relevant in determining VRA coverage, so might a state’s political culture be relevant in determining the scope and application of the First Amendment. \textsuperscript{137} Moreover, because Congress’s treating states differently under Section 5 on account of history and political culture was upheld by the Court in \textit{South Carolina v. Katzenbach}, \textsuperscript{138} it might be further argued that there is some judicial authority for states to be treated differently under the First Amendment.

To be sure, the Section 5 example is not fully on point. First, the issue raised by Section 5 and addressed in \textit{Katzenbach} was whether congressional legislation can apply differently or selectively to states; the First Amendment is not a piece of legislation. Second and related, \textit{Katzenbach} concerned efforts by the national Congress to apply different rules to different states, not to attempts by states themselves, because of their own political history and culture, to apply different rules to those within their jurisdiction than might be constitutionally permissible in other states. \textsuperscript{139} Third,

\textit{Principles}, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513 (2005) (discussing whether the courts should tailor the application of constitutional tests to the level of government enacting the challenged provision; i.e., whether courts should distinguish between provisions enacted at the state or local level as opposed to provisions enacted by the federal government). Rosen does not address whether courts should tailor their decisions based upon the circumstances of specific states as is suggested here.


\textsuperscript{135} See \textit{S.C. v. Katzenbach}, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (determining that "[t]he constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it reflects").

\textsuperscript{136} 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); 28 C.F.R. § 51.10.

\textsuperscript{137} The constitutionality of Section 5 is currently before the Court, which granted certiorari in \textit{Shelby County v. Holder} on November 9, 2012. 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), opinion below at 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The challengers’ claim, however, is not that treating the states differently is unconstitutional \textit{per se}, but that the initial reasons for treating certain jurisdictions differently have eroded since the time the VRA was passed. \textit{See also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder}, 557 U.S. 193, 197, 203 (2009) (declining to reach the constitutional question, but indicating, in dicta, that if voter discrimination is no longer particularly problematic in covered jurisdictions, Section 5 may be unconstitutional (emphasis added)).

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Katzenbach}, 383 U.S. 301, 308.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Katzenbach} addressed the legality of Section 5 under the so-called "doctrine of the equality of states," but that doctrine may be something of a misnomer. As the Court explained: "The doctrine of the...
Katzenbach employed a less demanding “rational means” test to the VRA when it upheld Section 5;140 the question of whether a similar campaign finance law can be upheld in one state and not another involves the application of the much more demanding “compelling interest” test directly to the provisions at issue.141 Thus, even if the Section 5 example suggests that there would be no constitutional difficulty solely because a law might be upheld in one state and not in another because of differing political cultures, it does not reach whether the preservation of a particular state’s political culture would be enough to constitute a compelling government interest for either state. Still, the Section 5 experience does show a state’s political culture can matter in the constitutional equation.

Nevertheless, even if theoretically possible that the Court could reach dissimilar results in reviewing the constitutionality of a particular type of provision depending upon the unique circumstances of the states in which the issue arose, I am not aware of any instances in which the Court has actually done so. Perhaps this issue may come up if the Court chooses to again review the constitutionality of voter identification laws142 given that the lower courts seem to reach different outcomes depending on how well the states have demonstrated that there is a voter fraud problem to be re-dressed.143

But even if the Court does reach the issue, there are still practical if not constitutional reasons to be skeptical that the Court would actually be willing to tailor its analysis of the constitutionality of campaign rules to the states’ political cultures. First, the Court might be troubled that reaching differing results on parallel measures would lead to the appearance of anomalous or arbitrary results. As noted earlier, it is at least awkward that a

equality of States . . . does not bar [Congress’s choice to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed necessary through the VRA], for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” 383 U.S. at 328–329.

The level of scrutiny to be applied when examining the constitutionality of the national government’s treating states differently also appears to be quite lenient. See Louis Touton, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 817, 834–835 (1980) (“[T]he equal footing doctrine does not require the federal government to treat every state equally. . . . Because different states embrace different portions of the nation, ‘area, location, geology, and latitude have created great diversity’ . . . . Congress must be able to adapt legislation admittedly within its power to meet these naturally diverse local needs.” (internal citations omitted)).

140. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“As against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”) (emphasis added).

141. See e.g. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898.


provision found constitutional in Montana could be unconstitutional in New York. Second, the Court might also be concerned with the workload costs inherent in an approach that would require it to review the constitutionality of controversial regulatory measures state by state rather than allow it to decide the matter wholesale. What is clear, however, is that, whether for these reasons or others, none of the United States Supreme Court Justices reviewing the Montana decision appeared to take the state court’s tailoring approach seriously. The problem is that respect for the divergence in the states’ political cultures means they should have.

VI. POSTSCRIPT—THE DECLINE IN THE UNIQUENESS OF STATES’ POLITICAL CULTURES

One other matter needs to be addressed before concluding. The argument that the states’ unique political cultures should be preserved, of course, depends upon the states actually having differing political cultures. And in that respect it must be noted that although many of the distinguishing structural features between the states discussed above remain intact, there is no doubt that state politics have become increasingly nationalized in the last few years. Part of this is due to the fact that some local issues may achieve national prominence because they are seen as harbingers of matters that will soon arise on the national stage. Another part of this is because national interest groups work to implement the same types of laws in a variety of states, thus nationalizing the debate over the advisability of these laws. And perhaps most saliently, much of this phenomenon stems from the rise of national political players who are able to mobilize resources across state lines.

144. See supra nn. 13–14 and accompanying text.
146. See supra Section III.
147. The Wisconsin recall election appears to be such an instance. See Tom Kertscher, Behind the Rhetoric: The In-State, Out-of-State Campaign Money Debate, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel: Politifact Wisconsin, http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2012/may/22/behind-rhetoric-state-out-state-money-debate/ (May 22, 2012) (reporting the opinion of one Wisconsin lobbyist: “donors outside of Wisconsin are motivated to give, depending on their political persuasion, because they want to see [Republican Governor] Walker’s reforms replicated or squelched in other states. The recall is also a ‘mini-barometer’ on the presidential election and the result could give a ‘psychological boost’ either to President Barack Obama or . . . Mitt Romney”).
from the influence of money. Already, for example, money from out-of-
state contributions floods local elections;\textsuperscript{149} and as a result, local politicians 
may feel that they are equally, if not more, accountable to their national 
funders than to their actual constituents.\textsuperscript{150} Even more broadly, the role of 
money in politics may have already become so pervasive in every state’s 
politics, that it may be too hard to correct against its further encroachment. 
The uniqueness of a state’s political culture and therefore the need to pre-
serve it, particularly with respect to the role of money, may be rapidly be-
coming a relic of the past.

VII. CONCLUSION

In its \textit{Western Tradition Partnership} decision, the Montana Supreme 
Court ruled that the constitutionality of state campaign finance restrictions 
should be reviewed with particular reference to the political history and 
traditions of the state enacting the regulation. In so holding, the Montana 
Court recognized that the states have different political cultures and that 
these different political cultures can lead to very different regulatory con-
cerns. On this basis, the Montana Court concluded that a type of campaign 
finance restriction that may be unconstitutional when applied to national 
elections or to elections in one state might be constitutionally permissible 
when applied to elections in another. The United States Supreme Court did 
not take this argument seriously. It should have. The political cultures of 
the states \textit{are} different, and applying a one-size-fits-all prescription to the 
constitutionality of campaign finance rules undercuts both this reality and 
sound principles and protections of federalism.

\textsuperscript{149} See Patrick M. Garry, Derek A. Nelsen & Candice J. Spurlin, \textit{Raising the Question of Whether 
Out-of-State Political Contributions May Affect a Small State’s Political Autonomy: A Case Study of the 
contributions on a state ballot measure). \textit{See also} N.Y. Mayor Bloomberg Didn’t Fare Well Backing 
mayor-bloomberg-didnt-fare-well-in-backing-california-campaigns.html (July 27, 2012) (noting the ef-
forts of New York Mayor and billionaire Michael Bloomberg to spend money to influence political 
issues in other states).

\textsuperscript{150} Cf. William P. Marshall, \textit{American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism}, 
22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 139, 151 (1998) (noting that federal officeholders may be more responsive 
to their funders than to their constituents).
TAKING OPT-IN RIGHTS SERIOUSLY: WHAT KNOX V. SEIU COULD MEAN FOR POST-CITIZENS UNITED SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the span of one week in June 2012, the United States Supreme Court deftly amplified corporate political speech rights1 and simultaneously hampered the political speech rights of unions.2 This election year development is troubling in light of the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission3 decision. One of Citizens United’s proffered rationales for giving corporations the same political speech rights as human beings was the equality of all political speakers.4 If corporations are tantamount to humans in the eyes of the law for First Amendment purposes,5 then surely corporations and unions should also be on equal footing.6 Yet they are not. On closer inspection, the five-Judge conservative majority of

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4. Id. at 898 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” (internal citations omitted)); Id. at 914–917 (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which barred corporations and unions from spending their general treasuries on electioneering communications).
the Supreme Court\(^7\) is not as absolutist in its zest for equality as the majority’s opinion in \textit{Citizens United} indicates.\(^8\)

This article will explore the implications of the Supreme Court’s disparate treatment of similarly-situated politically active corporations and unions. Two paths lead to more equitable treatment of these two groups: either (1) corporate political speech should be regulated more or (2) union political speech should be regulated less. This piece argues in favor of the former. In particular, corporate political spending lacks the transparency and consent mechanisms present in union political spending. Policymakers should address both of these failings in the corporate context.

The Roberts Supreme Court’s asymmetrical treatment of corporations and unions was on full display in the 2011–2012 term. \textit{American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock}\(^9\) coupled with \textit{Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000}\(^10\) demonstrates that a double standard persists between corporations, who are now privileged speakers in the Court’s eyes, and unions, who are currently disfavored speakers. The Supreme Court imposes different degrees of consent from corporations’ and unions’ constituent parts before they electioneer.\(^11\) Under U.S. law, corporations are not required to get consent from their shareholders before the corporate entity speaks politically using corporate funds.\(^12\) By contrast, public-sector un-

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\(^7\) Here, I am referring to Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.

\(^8\) The Court in \textit{Citizens United} harkened back to the Court in \textit{Bellotti}, which came to a similar conclusion. \textit{Citizens United}, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (citing \textit{First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti}, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (finding the inherent “worth of the speech . . . does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”)).

\(^9\) \textit{Am. Tradition Partn., Inc.}, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491.

\(^10\) \textit{Knox}, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296.

\(^11\) Victor Brudney, \textit{Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment}, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 1, 24–25 (1995) (“The considerations that justify individuals’ use of their wealth to power the intensity of their advocacy preferences and magnify their advocacy voices . . . do not justify the advocacy voices of multi-purpose associations. Members of associations often do not all agree with their organizations’ collective choice.”).

\(^12\) Frances R. Hill, \textit{Teaching Elements of Election Law Beyond the Disciplinary Borders of “Election Law”}, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 789, 799 (Spring 2012) (“Writing for the majority in \textit{Citizens United}, Justice Kennedy dismissed this issue with a breezy reference to ‘the ordinary mechanisms of corporate democracy.’ Experts in corporation law have expressed little confidence in this analysis.”); Anne Tucker, \textit{Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United}, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 497, 530–531 (Winter 2010) (“Political expenditure decisions—as directors currently implement them—therefore lack the approval or dissent of the citizen-shareholders, and there is no mechanism for shareholders to obtain detailed information regarding corporate political expenditures absent voluntary disclosures.”).
ions must receive nonmembers’ consent before political spending in certain circumstances.

In American Tradition Partnership, the Court had the chance to reexamine its controversial decision in Citizens United, which held that corporations have the right to spend their treasury funds for electioneering in federal elections. American Tradition Partnership reviewed a challenge to Montana’s century-old corporate political expenditure ban and gave the Court the opportunity to bless state regulation of corporate political spending in the name of federalism. Instead of taking this opportunity to test its theoretical assumptions about corruption in Citizens United by examining the actual facts arising out of Montana’s well-documented history of corporate political corruption, the Court summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court. American Tradition Partnership generated a slew of new condemnations as lawyers and reform advocates grasped that the Court would not deign to hear a case with a more robust factual record than the thin one offered to the Justices in Citizens United. Predictably, four Jus-
tics dissented from the summary reversal in *American Tradition Partnership*, providing yet another 5–4 Supreme Court decision in the area of campaign finance. 22 *American Tradition Partnership* clarified that corporations would have the unfettered ability to buy political ads in state elections despite the variation among the states or the policy preferences of their respective citizens.

Within a week, the Supreme Court also made new law in *Knox*, 23 a case that garnered far less fanfare and scrutiny than *American Tradition Partnership*. In *Knox*, the Court ruled that a public-sector union must give nonmembers of the union, who pay limited union dues, the ability to opt in to each new special assessment24 to pay for last-minute political expenditures before the union can spend the money.25 One way of conceptualizing the Supreme Court’s decision in *Knox* is that it required consent from nonmembers to use their money for political speech.

Until *Knox*, unions complied with controlling Supreme Court precedent if nonmembers were afforded the opportunity to opt out of the union’s political spending after the fact.26 The *Knox* holding represents a titanic shift by placing corporate managers and union leaders in decidedly diver-

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24. Here, a “special assessment” stands in contrast to a regular, annual assessment of union dues.

25. Id. at 2295.

26. *See* *Commun. Workers of Am. v. Beck*, 487 U.S. 735, 745, 768 (1988) (Labor unions differ from corporations in that union members who disagree with a union’s political activities need not give up full membership in the organization to avoid supporting its political activities. Although a union and an employer may require that all bargaining unit employees become union members, a union may not compel those employees to support financially “union activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment.”); *Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986) (temporary loans of nonmembers’ money for a union’s political program violated the First Amendment); *Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.*, 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (“Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
gent legal positions. Corporate managers have an advantage because they can spend on politics without getting consent from investors or other constituencies. (Indeed, as will be explained herein, corporations can even hide their political spending from shareholders.) Meanwhile, leaders of public-sector unions must perform the logistically formidable task of gathering individual opt-ins for special assessments from nonmembers before engaging in certain political spending.

Unions as well as corporations, ranging from tiny nonprofits to large multinationals, have been empowered by *Citizens United* to spend unlimited treasury funds in politics. Unlike unions, however, corporations are not subject to the opt-in requirement analogous to the *Knox* requirement for unions. Again, U.S. law imposes no duty on corporations to obtain shareholder consent before engaging in political spending. This American rule (perhaps better described as American rule-less-ness) stands in stark contrast to the United Kingdom’s approach to the identical circumstance.

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27. In contrast to *Knox*, a previous state court case held that unions did not have to get an opt-in for political spending. *Sanger v. Dennis*, 148 P.3d 404, 414–419 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming a preliminary injunction against a regulation requiring unions to obtain written permission before using a member’s dues or contributions to fund political campaigns, reasoning that plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of success on their claim that an “opt-in” requirement violated the members’ First Amendment freedom of association rights); see e.g. Erwin Chemerinsky, *High Court’s Union Dues Case May Change the Political Landscape*, A.B.A. J., http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_high_courts_union_dues_case_may_change_the_political_landscape (July 2, 2012); Mark Brenner, *Supreme Court Opens Door to ‘Open Shop’*, Labor Notes, http://labornotes.org/2012/07/supreme-court-opens-door-%E2%80%98open-shop%E2%80%99 (July 23, 2012).

28. *Citizens United*, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (“Before the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), federal law prohibited—and still does prohibit—corporations and unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections.”); see also id. at 913 (“[O]verruling *Austin* effectively invalidat[es] not only BCRA Section 203, but also 2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for express advocacy.”) (internal citation omitted).

29. Unlimited independent expenditures can be made not just by corporations but any “non-connected entities—including individuals, unincorporated associations, non-profit organizations, labor unions, and for-profit corporations.” *Republican Natl. Comm.*, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 152. Corporations and unions could already spend freely on ballot measures. See e.g. *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. at 777 (noting that the value of speech entitled to First Amendment protection “does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual”).

30. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert L. Jackson, *Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?*, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 89–90 (2010) (“Where the interests of directors and executives diverge from those of shareholders with sufficient regularity and magnitude, [such as in executive compensation,] corporate law rules impose special requirements designed to address this conflict.”).

U.K. statutory law requires shareholder authorization prior to corporate political spending.\textsuperscript{32}

With the Supreme Court unlikely to change legal positions on this issue until the Court’s composition itself changes, the responsibility to foster more equitable regulations for corporations is left to the American electorate, Congress, the States, and executive agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), which must work within the boundaries of current precedent.\textsuperscript{33} The Supreme Court’s ruling in \textit{Knox} requiring opt-ins for union political expenditures provides an additional basis for arguing that publicly traded American corporations should likewise marshal shareholder consent before corporate political expenditures are made.

\textbf{II. Definitions}

Before I proceed to meditate about how \textit{Knox} changed campaign finance and labor law, defining a few key terms and concepts is in order. Under labor law, workers in a bargaining unit can take a vote to unionize by majority rule.\textsuperscript{34} Even if a minority of workers in the bargaining unit object to the union, the union will nonetheless represent all of the workers in the bargaining unit in wage negotiations with managers, and the union can collect membership dues from all of the workers in the bargaining unit regardless of their desire to be in the union.\textsuperscript{35} Those who object to being in the union are known as “nonmembers.” Thus unions can have both members (willing participants paying full-dues) and nonmembers (employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement who pay limited dues and object to being part of the union).

Unions can require nonmember employees to pay their \textit{pro rata} share of annual dues to the union for the union’s collective bargaining costs on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–140, & sch. 19 (2000) (Eng.).
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ronald Dworkin, \textit{The Decision That Threatens Democracy}, N.Y. Review of Books, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/may/13/decision-threatens-democracy/?pagination=false (Apr. 15, 2010) (“Congress should also require that any corporation that wished to engage in electioneering obtain at least the annual consent of its stockholders to that activity and to a proposed budget for it, and that the required disclosure in an ad report the percentage of stockholders who have refused that blanket consent.”).
\item \textsuperscript{34} 29 U.S.C. § 159 (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.”).
\item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Community Org.}, 420 U.S. 50, 67 (1975). The rules are different in right-to-work states. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 10 (“In right-to-work states, employees who wish to form a union are effectively forced to subsidize the provision of the union benefits to co-workers who refuse to support the union.”); \textit{Hughes Tool Co.}, 104 NLRB 318 (1953) (union cannot charge nonmembers a fee in a right-to-work state).
\end{itemize}
behalf of all employees.\textsuperscript{36} The union fees for collective bargaining costs are known as “chargeable expenses” in labor law.\textsuperscript{37} The requirement that nonmembers who benefit financially from the union’s collective bargaining agreement pay dues prevents unfair freeriding.\textsuperscript{38} This power to collect dues is not plenary, however, as a line of Supreme Court cases has held that unions cannot use objecting nonmembers’ dues for political expenditures.\textsuperscript{39} Before \textit{Knox}, Supreme Court precedent dictated that nonmembers must be given a yearly opportunity to opt out of the union’s political spending and get back the \textit{pro rata} percentage of their dues attributable to politicking.\textsuperscript{40}

Public-sector unions are those unions that represent employees of the government. Courts have been particularly diligent in regulating public-sector unions to ensure that employees who must join a union in order to work for the government are not thereby coerced into espousing views the worker may find objectionable. Just like private-sector unions, which have nonmembers, public-sector unions can also have nonmembers. The \textit{Knox} case is about a public-sector union (Service Employees International Union, Local 1000) and its nonmembers.\textsuperscript{41}

### III. The Paycheck Protection Battle

One of the fault lines in the legislative and litigation battles over unions’ political spending has been whether union nonmembers must be given the opportunity to opt in or opt out of the union’s political spending. Those hostile to union power have tried to build on the Supreme Court’s rulings

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Knox}, 132 S. Ct. at 2303.
\textsuperscript{37} Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 15, at 17 n. 67 (“[C]hargeable expenses are those deemed to be for the collective bargaining activities, which nonmembers must pay for, while non-chargeable expenses are those for political activities, which nonmembers do not need to pay for.”).
\textsuperscript{38} Ross Runkel, \textit{When Union Fees Go Up. Must a “Hudson Notice” Go Out?}, SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/when-union-fees-go-up-must-a-“hudson-notice”-go-out/ (Jan. 5, 2012) (“An additional ‘agency shop agreement’ requires non-members in the bargaining unit to pay a percentage of the dues amount (an ‘agency fee’) to pay for the union’s expenses of performing services that benefit the bargaining unit.”).
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Communic. Workers of Am.}, 487 U.S. at 745; \textit{Abood}, 431 U.S. at 231–233; \textit{Ysursa}, 555 U.S. at 359; see also Bebchuk & Jackson, supra n. 30, at 114 (“But the Court has also acknowledged individuals’ constitutional interest in avoiding association with political messages with which they disagree—holding, for example, that unions violate the First Amendment rights of their members when union leaders spend union funds for political speech that the individual members oppose, even when the speech is in the members’ collective interest.”).
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Knox}, 132 S. Ct. at 2291–2292. Unionized workers receive separate protection under Supreme Court decisions that allow employees who do not want to support the union’s political activities to demand a refund of the portion of any mandatory union fee that is used for such purposes. See \textit{Communic. Workers of Am.}, 487 U.S. at 745; \textit{Abood}, 431 U.S. at 240; see also \textit{Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Assn.}, 551 U.S. 177, 184 (2007) (state may require its public-sector unions to receive affirmative authorization from a nonmember before spending the nonmember’s agency fees for election related purposes).
on nonmember opt-outs by adopting so-called paycheck protection laws to statutorily require opt-ins.\textsuperscript{42} Unions have resisted paycheck protection efforts all over the country, including in California where the issue has been on the ballot more than once.\textsuperscript{43} For example, in 1998 Proposition 226 ("Prop. 226") would have transformed California into a paycheck protection state. Many California unions countered Prop. 226 and were victorious.\textsuperscript{44} As I was writing this paper in 2012, the California Paycheck Protection Initiative ("Prop. 32") was on the ballot and, once again, it lost.\textsuperscript{45} So far, the voters have defeated all attempts at adopting paycheck protection in California. The Knox case arose out of a union’s efforts to defeat a paycheck protection ballot measure in 2005.

Unions have been able to defeat paycheck protection ballot measures and legislative bills in several states.\textsuperscript{46} This ideological battle has raged back and forth in the past couple of years. But California’s story has not been replicated everywhere. A handful of states have adopted so-called paycheck protection laws, which require unions to get nonmembers to opt in to political spending (as opposed to merely requiring an after the fact opt-out).\textsuperscript{47}

The issue of paycheck protection has been heavily litigated in the courts, including the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{48} In 2007, in \textit{Davenport v. Washington-}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Robert Reich, \textit{It’s Time for a Shareholder Protection Act}, http://robertreich.org/post/347547700 (Jan. 22, 2010) ("For many years, anti-union lobbyists have pushed what they call ‘pay-check protection’ laws, supposedly designed to protect union members from being forced, through their dues, to support union political activities they oppose. Under such laws—already in effect in several states—no union dues can be spent for any political purpose unless union members agree. The same principle should protect shareholders from being forced to spend their share of corporate earnings in favor of or against a particular candidate.").
  \item \textsuperscript{46} See Ariz. S.B. 1365 (defeated in the senate); Colo. Amend. 49 (2008) (defeated by voters); N.C. S.B. 727 (vetoed by the governor).
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Michael C. Kochkodin, \textit{A Good Politician Is One That Stays Bought: An Examination of Paycheck Protection Acts & Their Impact on Union Political Campaign Spending}, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Empl. L. 807, 810–822 (2000) ("Today, one of the most talked about issues in the ‘opt in’ versus ‘opt out’ debate is the emergence of ‘paycheck protection’ acts. Paycheck protection acts require unions to obtain written permission from workers before spending worker union dues or agency fees for political purposes. . . . Paycheck protection acts abolish ‘opt out’ union funding schemes in which ‘dissent is not
ton Education Association,49 the Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring public-sector labor unions to receive affirmative authorization from a nonmember before spending the nonmember’s agency-shop fees for electoral purposes.50 Justice Scalia noted in the Davenport lead opinion that public-sector unions only have these funds because employees are legally compelled to pay them.51 In other words, the Court found that the restriction is not on “how the union can spend ‘its’ money; it is a condition placed upon the union’s extraordinary state entitlement to acquire and spend other people’s money.”52 Davenport affirmed the right of states to adopt such paycheck protection laws under the Constitution.53 Davenport left states with the freedom to choose between adopting or rejecting paycheck protection. In 2012, the Court went one big step further in Knox, by constitutionally requiring an affirmative opt-in for nonmembers when public-sector unions make a special assessment to spend in an upcoming election (regardless of whether states desire this extra requirement or not).54 Given the traditional competition between labor and corporations in the political realm, this begs the question whether the logic of Knox should extend to corporations as a matter of basic fairness.55

IV. CENTRAL HOLDINGS OF KNOX

The Knox case arose out of a 2005 ballot measure fight in California spawned by Governor Schwarzenegger’s attempt to curb the power of pub-
lic-sector unions during a special election. To battle Schwarzenegger’s ballot initiatives, the Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 (“SEIU”) charged its members and nonmembers a special one-time assessment as the 2005 election intensified. One measure on the California ballot, Proposition 75 (“Prop. 75”), would have required unions to get employees’ affirmative consent before charging them fees to be used for a union’s political purposes. Put another way, Prop. 75 would have changed California into a paycheck protection state in 2005. Also on the ballot at the same time was Proposition 76 (“Prop. 76”), which would have given the Governor of California the power to reduce appropriations for public unions’ employees’ compensation.

SEIU’s ability to collect dues from nonmembers, including special assessments, was derived from both California law and contract law. SEIU made a special assessment to pay for the Union’s opposition to the Schwarzenegger ballot initiatives. Objecting nonmembers of SEIU, including Diane Knox, sued, complaining that the Union’s levying a special assessment without providing them with a second Hudson notice was unconstitutional. A “Hudson notice” is a notice given to union nonmembers alerting them that the union has made political expenditures, so that they have the ability to opt out of their dues being used for the union’s political spending after the fact. In this case, SEIU had given one Hudson notice for the past year’s political spending, but not a second Hudson notice for


57. Paycheck protection was on the California ballot in 1998 in Prop. 226 and was defeated. Prop. 75 was also defeated in 2005. Prop. 32, which tried to impose paycheck protection once more, was on the California ballot in November 2012 and failed. See Joe Garofoli, Teachers Union Drops $7.5 Million Against Prop. 32, San Francisco Chronicle Politics Blog, http://blog.sfgate.com/nov05election/2012/08/03/teachers-union-drops-7-5-million-against-prop-32/ (Aug. 3, 2012).


the special assessment to pay for the battle against the Schwarzenegger ballot measures (Prop. 75 and Prop. 76) during the special election in 2005.\footnote{Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285–2286.}

Writing for the majority in \textit{Knox}, Justice Alito held that unions may not use objecting nonmembers’ money, even temporarily, for politics:

\begin{quote}
[\texttt{R}]equiring objecting nonmembers to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of union dues—as opposed to exempting them from making such payments unless they opt in—represents a remarkable boon for unions. . . . An opt-out system creates a risk that the fees paid by nonmembers will be used to further political and ideological ends with which they do not agree. But a “[u]nion should not be permitted to exact a service fee from nonmembers without first establishing a procedure which will avoid the risk that their funds will be used, even temporarily, to finance ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.”\footnote{Id. at 2290 (quoting \textit{Hudson}, 475 U.S. at 305) (internal citations omitted).}
\end{quote}

SEIU’s failure to send out a separate \textit{Hudson} notification drew ire from the majority, which characterized this behavior as an “aggressive use of power” and “indefensible.”\footnote{Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291.}

Seven of the nine Justices concluded that a second \textit{Hudson} notice was indeed necessary.\footnote{Id. at 2296–2297 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Ginsburg, J.).} But the five-person majority went even further, stating that an affirmative opt-in, instead of just an opt-out, was constitutionally required. As Justice Alito wrote for the five-person majority:

\begin{quote}
To respect the limits of the First Amendment, the union should have sent out a new notice allowing nonmembers to opt in to the special fee rather than requiring them to opt out. Our cases have tolerated a substantial impingement on First Amendment rights by allowing unions to impose an opt-out requirement at all. Even if this burden can be justified during the collection of regular dues on an annual basis, there is no way to justify the additional burden of imposing yet another opt-out requirement to collect special fees whenever the union desires.\footnote{Id. at 2293 (majority).}
\end{quote}

In other words, the majority in \textit{Knox} required consent before the Union spent other people’s money on politics. In the deepest of ironies, Prop. 75, the paycheck protection ballot measure that was defeated by California’s voters\footnote{Institute for Governmental Studies, \textit{Proposition 75}, http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/elections/proposition-75 (Nov. 8, 2005).} and was the motivation for SEIU to spend in the California election in 2005, was partially resurrected by judicial fiat in the \textit{Knox} case, which requires affirmative opt-ins for a public-sector union’s political spending.

One thing that \textit{Knox} does not clarify is whether opt-ins will be required of public-sector unions as a general matter whenever they make political expenditures or whether the requirement will only apply to special assessments. Another open question is whether \textit{Knox}’s opt-in requirement
will only be applied in the context of public-sector unions. Unions at private companies do not necessarily raise the same concerns about governmental compelled speech because of a lack of state action. The language in *Knox* seems quite broad, but only future cases with different facts will clarify the scope of *Knox*’s holdings.

What is clear is that in *Knox* the Supreme Court continued a peculiar pattern of providing fewer protections to unions *vis-à-vis* other political spenders. As Professor Charlotte Garden argues, “When it comes to First Amendment protections, it has been well documented that labor unions receive less protection than other social movement groups, and their speech sometimes receives less protection than even commercial speech.”

V. THE LOGIC OF REQUIRING OPT-IN FOR PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS

Although the issue of nonmember opt-in had not been fully briefed, the Supreme Court in *Knox* crafted, seemingly out of whole cloth, a broad new right for nonmembers of public-sector unions to consent to political expenditures before the fact:

Public-sector unions have the right under the First Amendment to express their views on political and social issues without government interference. But employees who choose not to join a union have the same rights... when a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union must provide a fresh *Hudson* notice and may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative consent.

Again, the Supreme Court could not have been clearer in stating that public-sector unions in particular must give nonmembers the ability to opt in to each new special assessment for political spending.

The Supreme Court reasoned that opt-ins were constitutionally required for public-sector unions for three reasons: (A) nonmembers had the right not to be compelled to speak; (B) the government could not be forced

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69. Had the issue been fully briefed, the Court may have taken more care to notice that the nonmembers in this case had not been forced to pay for the special assessment at all. Fisk & Chemerinsky, *supra* n. 15, at 17 (“[F]or the fiscal year that began in July 2005, the SEIU’s nonchargeable expenditures were lower than they had been in the year ending June 2005. Only 31% of its expenditures were nonchargeable (as compared to 44% in the prior year). Hence, the dissenters ended up being charged less, including the emergency temporary assessment, than was their fair share of the union’s annual expenses. Thus, on the facts of the case, none of the plaintiffs was actually forced to subsidize any political speech.” (internal citations omitted)).

70. *Knox*, 132 S. Ct. at 2295–2296 (internal citations omitted).
to subsidize the union’s political speech; and (C) dissenting workers need particular protection.

A. The Right Not to Speak

The Supreme Court has long held the view that the First Amendment protects not only the right to speak but also the right not to speak. The compelled speech cases prevent the government from forcing individuals from endorsing messages that the individual would rather not espouse.71

As a consequence of the right not to speak, nonmembers of both private- and public-sector unions have the right to object to funding union spending that is not germane to the union’s collective bargaining responsibilities.72 This right not to be compelled to speak in the union context is rooted in federal statutes (such as the Railway Labor Act73 and the National Labor Relations Act74), as well as the First Amendment.75

The right to be free of compelled speech applies to both “agency shops,” under which employees can choose whether to join the union, and “union shops,” under which all employees must be union members. According to the Supreme Court, in the union shops, unions must avail poten-

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71. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006) (holding that a statute requiring law schools to accommodate military recruiters does not constitute compelled speech); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court always assumed that the proscription on compelled-subsidy speech did not apply when the government was the speaker); U.S. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (stating that the First Amendment “prevent[s] the government from compelling individuals to express certain views or from compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object” (internal citations omitted)); Bd. of Regents of U. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 233–234 (2000) (holding that a required student fee to fund extracurricular activities at a university is not compelled speech so long as the funding is viewpoint neutral); Riley v. Natl. Fedn. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988) (stating that, for First Amendment purposes, no difference exists between compelled speech and compelled silence); W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (stating that the First Amendment was designed to prevent both limiting speech and coercing speech).

72. From a constitutional point of view, the opt-out requirements’ being extended to private-sector unions is particularly interesting since there is not any obvious state action in a contract among private parties. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 807 n. 28 (2012) (citing Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 Hastings L.J. 1, 83 (1989) (“[L]abor law . . . has statutorily protected constitutional interests of workers by balancing workers’ right of free association against other competing legitimate interests [even absent state action].”)).


74. Commun. Workers of Am., 487 U.S. at 745 (decided on statutory, not constitutional, grounds); see also Garden, supra n. 68, at 37 (“The Court ultimately avoided the constitutional question and held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the NLRA permitted unions and employers to require employees to become union members, but the ‘membership’ that could be required had been ‘whittled down to its financial core,’ . . . [which] covered ‘the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to “performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”’”).

75. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 226.
tial members of membership that has been “whittled down to its financial core” of negotiating labor contracts and other economic matters between labor and management, such as strikes.\textsuperscript{76} In \textit{Knox}, the Court’s concern with compelled speech was at the heart of the decision. As the Court wrote:

[B]y allowing unions to collect any fees from nonmembers and by permitting unions to use opt-out rather than opt-in schemes when annual dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First Amendment rights of nonmembers. . . . The general rule—individuals should not be compelled to subsidize private groups or private speech—should prevail.\textsuperscript{77}

Another way of framing this is the Supreme Court hereby privileged the autonomy of the individual over the autonomy of the labor organization to speak (or not speak) politically.

\textbf{B. No Government Subsidies for Political Speech}

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence makes it evident that the government is not required to subsidize political speech, including in the public-sector union context.\textsuperscript{78} As the Court clarified in \textit{Davenport}, “it is well established that the government can make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech.”\textsuperscript{79}

In 2009’s \textit{Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association},\textsuperscript{80} the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Idaho statute that imposed criminal penalties on unions that funded political activities with money automatically deducted from government employees’ paychecks. This law required unions to collect any money to be used for political speech separately from union dues. The Court upheld the Idaho law, concluding once more that the government “is not required to assist others in funding the expression of political speech.”

79. \textit{Davenport}, 551 U.S. at 188–189; see also \textit{Ysursa}, 555 U.S. at 359 (“Idaho is under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities. And the State’s decision not to do so is not an abridgment of the unions’ speech . . . .”); \textit{Aric, Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC}, 131 S. Ct. at 2816 (“Laws that burden political speech are accordingly ‘subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’”); id. at 2834 (“And under the First Amendment, that makes all the difference. In case after case, year upon year, we have distinguished between speech restrictions and speech subsidies.”).
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particular ideas, including political ones."\textsuperscript{81}  
Knox likewise concluded, "The government may not prohibit the dissemination of ideas it disfavors, nor compel the endorsement of ideas that it approves."\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{C. Dissenting Workers’ Rights}

The Knox majority was particularly concerned with the rights of workers who were involuntarily nonmembers of the union, who might object to the union’s political views. As the majority stated, "When a State establishes an ‘agency shop’ that exacts compulsory union fees as a condition of public employment, ‘[t]he dissenting employee is forced to support financially an organization with whose principles and demands he may disagree.’"\textsuperscript{83}

The Supreme Court referred to this situation as an “impingement” on the First Amendment rights of the dissenting workers.\textsuperscript{84}  The Court’s concern with the rights of dissenting union members is not a newfangled concept.\textsuperscript{85}  For example, in 1991, a plurality of the Supreme Court held in \textit{Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association}.

\textsuperscript{86}  The burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great where, as here, the compelled speech is in a public context. By utilizing [the employees’] funds for political lobbying and to garner the support of the public in its endeavors, the union would use each dissenter as “an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{87}

Thus, the Court has been and continues to be solicitous towards workers who do not wish to subsidize unions’ political speech. Overall, this is consistent with the general pattern of the courts being more eager to curtail the political speech rights of unions\textsuperscript{88} than they have been with corporate political speech.\textsuperscript{89}  As a matter of equity, the Court should be troubled as well about the inability of shareholders to consent to corporate political spending.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81.} \textit{Id.} at 357–358.
  \item \textsuperscript{82.} \textit{Knox}, 132 S. Ct. at 2288.
  \item \textsuperscript{83.} \textit{Id.} at 2282.
  \item \textsuperscript{84.} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{85.} Heather K. Gerken, \textit{Dissenting by Deciding}, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1746–1747 (May 2005) (explaining that dissenters “speak truth to power” by attempting to persuade the majority).
  \item \textsuperscript{86.} \textit{Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn.}, 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
  \item \textsuperscript{87.} \textit{Id.} at 522 (quoting \textit{Wooley v. Maynard}, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
  \item \textsuperscript{88.} See \textit{Abood}, 431 U.S. at 243–244 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("I am unable to see a constitutional distinction between a governmentally imposed requirement that a public employee be a Democrat or Republican or else lose his job, and a similar requirement that a public employee contribute to the collective-bargaining expenses of a labor union.").
  \item \textsuperscript{89.} See \textit{Citizens United}, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (upholding corporate speech rights over shareholder protection objections); \textit{Bellotti}, 435 U.S. at 793–795 (same).
\end{itemize}
Knox was not drafted on a blank slate. Congress, state legislatures, voters, and courts have contested the political rights of unions for at least six decades. From a statutory point of view, corporations and unions have often been regulated in parallel ways for campaign finance purposes. These groups have been policed as the result of a bipartisan tug of war: Democrats typically target corporations, while Republicans typically target unions.90 The following is a brief overview of how corporations and unions have been subjected to nearly identical legal schemas.

For the past sixty-plus years, federal statutory law has treated unions and corporations equally for the purposes of campaign finance expenditure and contribution bans. For instance, both groups are forbidden from directly contributing to federal candidates under the Tillman (1907)91 and Taft-Hartley (1947) Acts.92 In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act banned both unions and corporations from making independent expenditures in favor of federal candidates.93 While the direct contribution ban persists because of a case called Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,94 Citizens United has negated the independent expenditure ban.95

90. Samuel F. Wright, Clipping the Political Wings of Labor Unions: An Examination of Existing Law and Proposals for Change, 5 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 1, 35 (1982) (“Because labor union contributions and expenditures overwhelmingly favor Democrats, several Republican Senators and Congressmen have introduced bills designed to ‘clip the political wings’ of labor unions.”).
92. Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 1179, 1198 n. 98 (2002) (asserting that an arguable justification for treating corporations and unions the same has to do with “the same combination of government-provided support and lack of correlation between the payment of union dues and support for the union’s electoral position [that] provide support for the limits on unions”); Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corporations?: The Constitutionality of Limitations on Corporate Electoral Speech after Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. Rev. 307, 312–313 (Fall 2011) (“Four decades after the enactment of the Tillman Act, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act (also known as the Labor Management Relations Act). This 1947 law prohibited corporations and labor unions from making independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, federal candidates. Taft-Hartley was the precursor to the provision of McCain-Feingold struck down by the Court in Citizens United.” (internal citations omitted)).
93. Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Labor, To Regulate Labor Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 804 and H.R. 1483, 78th Cong. (1943) (Con. Gerald W. Landis (R-IN) testified, “The public was aroused by many rumors of huge war chests being maintained by labor unions, of enormous fees and dues being extorted from war workers, of political contributions to parties and candidates which later were held as clubs over the head of high Federal officials.” And he sought to “put labor unions on exactly the same basis, insofar as their financial activities are concerned, as corporations have been on for many years.”).
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA") allowed both corporations and unions to establish separate segregated funds (a.k.a. PACs), which may solicit and collect money from specified corporate- or union-affiliated individuals96 and make contributions to candidates.97 Prior to 

Citizens United, both groups were required to spend through PACs in federal elections.98 The two groups were allowed to communicate directly with their own members without running afoul of the campaign finance laws.99 Both were also subject to certain disclosure requirements under federal law.100 The Federal Election Commission ("FEC") has promulgated regulations to enforce campaign finance laws, and these FEC regulations have treated both groups with similar strictures.101

In 2002, when Congress closed loopholes in the federal campaign finance laws, it chose to treat corporations and unions identically once

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97. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(B). The limited class for corporations is defined as stockholders, executive personnel, administrative personnel, and family members. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(1) (2011). For unions, the limited class is union members, executive personnel, administrative personnel, and family members. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(2).

98. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 581, 588 (2011) ("The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") blessed the political action committee ("PAC") alternative: corporations and unions could establish separate political committees to spend money on these campaigns, but these PACs were limited in both the amount that could be contributed to candidates and who could be solicited to contribute."); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154 ("[T]he [corporate contribution] ban has always done further duty in protecting ‘the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.’" (internal citations omitted)); id. at 163 ("The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure . . . .").

99. U.S. v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 123–124 (1948) ("We are unwilling to say that Congress by its prohibition against corporations or labor organizations making an ‘expenditure in connection with any election’ of candidates for federal office intended to outlaw such a publication. We do not think § 313 reaches such a use of corporate or labor organization funds.").

100. Jennifer S. Taub, Money Managers in the Middle: Seeing and Sanctioning Political Spending after Citizens United, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 443, 452 (2012) ("Under McCain-Feingold, corporations and unions were subject to two major expenditure prohibitions as well as disclaimer, disclosure, and reporting requirements . . . .").

101. Cynthia L. Bauerly & Eric C. Hallstrom, Square Pegs: The Challenges for Existing Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Age of the Super PAC, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 329, 336 (2012) ("For the last thirty years, the FEC has developed rules governing the participation of corporations and labor unions in electioneering activities based on the principle that both contributions and expenditures were forbidden."). After 

more.\textsuperscript{102} Congress banned both from making so-called “sham issues ads” (a.k.a. electioneering communications).\textsuperscript{103} This electioneering communication ban, along with Taft-Hartley’s independent expenditure ban, were overturned as unconstitutional in \textit{Citizens United}, thereby allowing both groups to spend in federal elections, so long as they spend the money independently of federal candidates.\textsuperscript{104} The 2002 law (known as “McCain-Feingold,” the “Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act,” or “BCRA”) also banned corporations and unions from donating so-called “soft money” to political parties.\textsuperscript{105} The BCRA soft money ban still survives.\textsuperscript{106}

The motivation behind the federal corporate and union bans was a normative judgment by Congress that economic war chests should not be converted into political war chests.\textsuperscript{107} As the Supreme Court explained in \textit{Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee},\textsuperscript{108} the two primary purposes of the bans were to: (1) “ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political ‘war chests’

\textsuperscript{102} Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 Geo. L.J. 871, 935 (2004) (“BCRA’s new limitations on corporate and union electoral activity further restrict executives’ ability to misuse ‘other people’s money’ by prohibiting expenditure of general treasury funds on parties or sham issue advertising campaigns.”).


\textsuperscript{104} Hasen, supra n. 6, at 557 (“Congress failed to fill the gaping holes in the federal disclosure rules that followed the Supreme Court’s \textit{Citizens United} decision, freeing corporate and labor union money in the political process.” (internal citations omitted)).

\textsuperscript{105} 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2002); Spencer Overton, The Participation Interest, 100 Geo. L.J. 1259, 1266–1267 (Apr. 2012) (“Within a few election cycles, innovative lawyers carved loopholes in the federal restrictions, and reformers crafted and pushed for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 to plug the loopholes. The 2002 Act banned soft money contributions to parties (which previously were unlimited) and restricted ‘sham issue ad’ political spending by corporations and unions.” (internal citations omitted)); Jan Witold Baran, Address Money, Politics, and Lobbying, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev. 913, 915 (Summer 2009) (“[BCRA] also federalized fundraising by political parties by prohibiting the solicitation, collection, or use of ‘soft money,’ which predominantly were funds from corporations and unions.”).


\textsuperscript{107} U.S. v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585, 590–592 (1957) (describing the government’s effort “to avoid the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital”); id. at 572 (quoting H. Comm. on Election of Pres., Vice-Pres., & Reps. in Cong., Hearing on Contributions to Political Committees in Presidential and Other Campaigns, 59th Cong. (1906) (“The greatest moral question which now confronts us is, Shall the trusts and corporations be prevented from contributing money to control or aid in controlling elections?”)); \textit{Citizens United}, 130 S. Ct. at 933 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role that corporations and unions play in electoral politics.”).

\textsuperscript{108} Natl. Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197.
which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions”; and (2) “protect the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed.” The law provided these protections for over 60 years. Now those protections have largely been eradicated through *Citizens United* and its 2012 companion, *American Tradition Partnership*.

VII. THE SUPREME COURT’S SUPERFICIAL EQUAL TREATMENT OF CORPORATIONS AND UNIONS

Following Congress’s lead, the Supreme Court has also treated corporations and unions similarly with respect to campaign finance bans, with one notable exception in *Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce*. The Court has traditionally thought of corporate and union spending in the same breath. For example, pre-*Citizens United*, the Court was equally focused on preventing ideological nonprofits from funneling corporate and union money into federal elections. And in 2003, in *McConnell v. Federal Election Commission*, the Supreme Court held that the federal government can constitutionally prohibit political parties from accepting corporate and union money.

For most of the twentieth century, the Court deferred to Congress’s and state legislatures’ line-drawing judgments in campaign finance statutes, including the choice to ban certain organizations from spending in elections. That deference ended with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s death and

109. Id. at 207–208; see also Fed. Election Commn. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (“This concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political ideas.”); id. (“Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”).

110. *Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com.*, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). *Austin* upheld a Michigan law that banned corporate independent expenditures but not unions’. As the Court in *Austin* explained, “Whereas unincorporated unions, and indeed individuals, may be able to amass large treasuries, they do so without the significant state-conferrered advantages of the corporate structure.” Id. at 665.

111. *Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.*, 479 U.S. at 263–264 (invalidating then-applicable independent expenditure limits on nonprofit corporations that accepted no money from business corporations or labor unions). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in *Bellotti*, felt corporations and unions could both be subject to campaign finance limitations. *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. at 826–827 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding “any particular form of organization upon which the State confers special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.”).


113. Id. at 155–156, *partially overruled on other grounds*, *Citizens United*, 130 S. Ct. at 913.

Justice O’Connor’s retirement and the ascension to the bench of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito in 2006. As Justice Breyer once complained about his new brethren: “It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much.”

The Roberts Supreme Court held in *Citizens United* that requiring political activity to be conducted through separate segregated funds or PACs impermissibly burdens corporate and union freedom of expression. This dismantling of the rules on organizational political spending is part of a greater deregulatory trend led by the Supreme Court. Over the past six years, the Roberts Supreme Court has actively deregulated many of the rules that heretofore had governed campaign finance in both federal and state elections. Not only has the Court struck down Vermont’s contribution limits as being too low, invalidated the federal Millionaire’s Amendment as discrimination against the rich, and declared that the tie goes to the speaker should one arise between speakers and regulators, but in *Citizens United*, the Supreme Court gave corporations and unions the First Amendment right to spend an unlimited amount of money on political ads—placing them on equal footing with human beings. And capping off this trend, *American Tradition Partnership* reaffirmed *Citizens United* for the purpose of state elections.

This deregulation has rippled through lower courts as well. Thanks to a lesser-known 2010 case called *SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission*, corporations and unions have a new political vehicle to use:

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116. *See Citizens United*, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (“PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.”).


119. *Davis*, 554 U.S. at 743–744 (invalidating the federal Millionaire’s Amendment).

120. *Wis. Right to Life, Inc.*, 551 U.S. at 474 (“WRTL II”) (invalidating the federal source restriction for ads that were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy).


independent expenditure only committees or what the press has dubbed “Super PACs.” Super PACs have enabled corporations and unions to aggregate their unlimited funds along with money from individuals and associations to buy political ads in federal elections, so long as the ads are purchased independently of candidate campaigns. The creation of Super PACs for both corporations and unions has been blessed by the FEC.

When it comes to analyzing the campaign finance regulation of corporations and unions, the Supreme Court has been willing to uphold (in the case of Beaumont) or strike down (in the case of Citizens United) regulations for both groups with an even hand. But as discussed in this piece, the Supreme Court has simultaneously participated in diluting the ability of unions to use their rights to spend in politics through the opt-out and opt-in cases.

VIII. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNION AND CORPORATE CONTEXTS

Arguably, unions should never have been lumped in with corporations in federal campaign finance laws since the two groups are structurally different. Academics have argued that corporations deserve more restrictive campaign finance regulation than their union counterparts because of the state conferred advantages that go with the corporate form, such as limited liability for investors and perpetual existence.

123. Bauerly & Hallstrom, supra n. 101, at 343–344 (“Citizens United, SpeechNow, as well as EM-ILY’s List, and more recently Carey, concluded that neither FECA’s prohibition on corporate and labor union contributions nor its amount limits may constitutionally be applied to contributions made for the purpose of financing independent communications.”).


125. See e.g. Sachs, supra n. 72 (Sachs discusses why opt-out rights available to union members create an inherently unequal relationship when compared with corporations because shareholders have no right to object to corporate political spending. Additionally, the article points out other advantages that government confers upon corporations, including limited liability and tax exemptions.).

Moreover, labor unions make up the lowest percentage of the American workforce in nearly a century.127 The smaller scale of unions compared to the scale of corporations is an additional reason that formal equal treatment may lead to unequal results.128 Even the biggest union129 is dwarfed when compared with the biggest corporation.130 As the Supreme Court once wrote in *Buckley v. Valeo*,131 “Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike.”132

Furthermore, union members working in a single location are more likely to share political opinions vis-à-vis economic policy choices in comparison with disparate shareholders living around the world, who may have nothing in common.133 This is an additional reason why unions should get


128. See e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., *The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated*, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1031 (2012) (“Labor unions can lobby and make political contributions, but their political power has steadily subsided for decades as the percentage of the unionized U.S. work force has declined.”); Emma Greenman, *Note, Strengthening the Hand of Voters in the Marketplace of Ideas: Roadmap to Campaign Finance Reform in a Post-Wisconsin Right to Life Era*, 24 J.L. & Pol. 209, 242–243 (Summer 2008) (“Concentrated aggregations of corporate and union money are not equally distributed, and political spending may not reflect the interests or preferences of the dispersed shareholders or union members who ultimately control the company or union. Giving the diverse community of shareholders and union members the opportunity to opt-out, or prevent corporate and union general treasury dollars from being spent in the political arena, could provide a valuable check on the use of money aggregated in the economic arena to disproportionately influence the political debate.”).

129. One could argue about how to define the “biggest” in this context. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. labor union with the most assets ($480 million) in 2012 was Electrical Workers IBEW AFL-CIO, and the U.S. labor union with the most members (11.5 million) in 2012 was the AFL-CIO.

130. Sprague & Wells, supra n. 16, at 508 (“But what the Citizens United majority conveniently ignored is one particular attribute which has existed for at least one hundred years: that exceptionally large corporations, controlled by a handful of individuals, have amassed great quantities of wealth and power, which dwarf the resources of the individual electorate, as well as the corporations’ own minority shareholders, ultimately diluting individuals’ political voice.”); see also Vincent Trivett, *25 U.S. Mega Corporations: Where They Rank If They Were Countries*, Business Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-bigger-than-countries-2011-6 (June 27, 2011) (“If Wal-Mart were a country, its revenues would make it on par with the GDP of the 25th largest economy in the world [ ], surpassing 157 smaller countries.”); Steve Coll, *Gusher: The Power of ExxonMobil*, The New Yorker, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/04/09/120409fa_fact_coll (Apr. 9, 2012) (“ExxonMobil has developed an algorithmic formula for political spending and lobbying that has reinforced its alignment with Republican candidates. Exxon’s annual revenues, of four hundred billion dollars, are about the same as the GDP of Norway.”).


132. Id. at 97–98 (referring to the differential treatment of major and minor political parties under FECA).

133. Richard L. Hasen, *Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law’s Emerging Egalitarian*, 1 Alb. Govt. L. Rev. 169, 191 (2008) (Hasen discusses his disappointment with Justice Souter’s dissent in *WRTL II* because it equated labor union spending with corporate spending. The author then goes on to
more (not less) flexibility in political spending in comparison to corporations.134

As Professor Adam Winkler once explained, union members are likely
to have more information about their union’s political spending than a
shareholder is going to have about corporate political spending: “sharehold-
ers simply will not know when the corporations in which they have invested
make political expenditures, much less make them to support causes they
disagree with or make them with general treasury funds . . . .”135 By con-
trast, union members may be more in the know. As Professor Winkler con-
tinued:

A union member may actually be better able to discover the use of his dues
than a shareholder because he works with other dues-paying members in a
union shop where information may spread easily. . . . [A] dissenting share-
holder . . . faces problems associated with limited control and limited knowl-
edge that make divestment an utterly ineffective remedy for unwanted corpo-
rate electoral spending.136

This is one more reason why prophylactic rules/laws requiring disclosure in
the corporate political spending context are needed.

A. Transparency Differences among Corporations and Unions

While corporations and unions get similar treatment in terms of federal
contribution bans, the parallels end there. Union political speech is far
more heavily regulated under current labor law. For example, union politi-
cal spending is more transparent than its corporate analog.137 Unions file
political reports with the Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Manage-
ment Standards pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting Act of
1959.138 A reporting union must distribute this information to its mem-
ers,139 and the Department of Labor treats this information as public.140

134. Natl. Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he ‘differing structures and purposes’ of
different entities ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral
process.’” (quoting Cal. Med. Assn., 453 U.S. at 201)).


136. Id. at 205.

137. See e.g. Adam Crowther, Opponents of Campaign Finance Disclosure Create False Distinc-
tions in Treatment of Unions and Corporations: The DISCLOSE Act Would Apply Equally to Both,
Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/documents/campaign-finance-disclosure-unions-vs-corporations-
report.pdf (Nov. 28, 2012); Rick Cohen, Time to Revive Democracy in the U.S.: Tell Shareholders How
2-uncategorised/18971-time-to-revive-democracy-in-the-us-tell-shareholders-how-their-dollars-are-used
-in-politics.html#.URAqVKU72Ag (Jan. 11, 2012).


139. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c).
Form LM-2\textsuperscript{141} requires the union to disclose “all direct and indirect . . . political disbursements or contributions in money,” defined as any disbursement “intended to influence” the outcome of a primary or general election, as well as all lobbying disbursements made with the intent of influencing public policy.\textsuperscript{142} Form LM-2 also requires the disclosure of additional information that pertains to disbursements of $5,000 or more, including information about the recipient, amount, and purpose.\textsuperscript{143} The filing organization must also report the total amount it disbursed for the filing period.\textsuperscript{144} Copies of completed LM-2 forms are available online through the Labor Department’s website.\textsuperscript{145}

Corporations are not under similar legal duties to disclose their political spending to investors. In 2010, Nell Minow, an expert in corporate governance, gave a speech addressing the new corporate political spending unleashed by \textit{Citizens United} and the transparency problem it created for investors. Ms. Minow urged:

If investors are going to be able to send some kind of a market reaction to this political speech by corporations, we have to have better disclosure. We are currently facing a situation where some companies are taking public positions in favor of one thing and then funneling money to intermediary groups to oppose it. We can’t have that any more. So, we need better disclosure about the contributions and other kinds of political speech pay, that is paid out.\textsuperscript{146}

The SEC, which regulates publicly traded companies, should take a page from the Labor Department’s playbook and require transparency from corporations that spend in politics.\textsuperscript{147} At present, the SEC rules contain no requirement for publicly traded companies to inform the investing public about their political spending.\textsuperscript{148} This may change in the near future.\textsuperscript{149} In

\textsuperscript{140} 29 U.S.C. § 435.
\textsuperscript{141} 29 C.F.R. §§ 403.2 to 403.3.
\textsuperscript{143} Id.
\textsuperscript{144} Id.
2011, ten corporate law professors petitioned the SEC to require disclosure of corporate political spending. A record-breaking 480,000 people filed public comments with the Commission urging it to act on this petition. In late 2012, the SEC placed a potential rule addressing corporate political spending on the Office of Management and Budget’s (“OMB”) Regulatory Agenda. According to the OMB, a notice of proposed rule-making on corporate political spending by the SEC is scheduled for 2013.

B. Differences in Consent for Corporations and Unions

Besides the differences in the level of transparency for politically active corporations and unions, there is also a marked difference in the level of consent that each group is required to get from its constituents before it spends in politics. As Professors Bebchuk and Jackson explain in the Harvard Law Review: “corporate law rules do not require a company to separate political spending from other expenses or to provide shareholders with specific details about that spending.”

Moreover, the Supreme Court in Citizens United seemed hopelessly optimistic that corporate democracy would protect shareholder interests...
in preventing political spending that could offend investors.\textsuperscript{156} As the \textit{Citizens United} majority argued:

Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed interests. The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.\textsuperscript{157}

Justice Stevens writing for the dissent in \textit{Citizens United} roundly rejected this argument:

[B]y “corporate democracy,” presumably the Court means the rights of shareholders to vote and to bring derivative suits for breach of fiduciary duty. In practice, however, many corporate lawyers will tell you that “these rights are so limited as to be almost nonexistent,” given the internal authority wielded by boards and managers and the expansive protections afforded by the business judgment rule.\textsuperscript{158}

One reason for concern about the robustness of quotidian corporate democracy comes from outside of the campaign finance context. A year after \textit{Citizens United}, the SEC promulgated a rule pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act that would have given shareholders the ability to run their own nominees for board elections.\textsuperscript{159} This proxy access rule was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit Court.\textsuperscript{160} As a result of this ruling, the mechanisms of corporate democracy are far from functional in the fundamental area of board elections.\textsuperscript{161}


\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Citizens United}, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (internal quotations omitted).

\textsuperscript{158} Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).


\textsuperscript{160} The proxy access rule was vacated by \textit{Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Commn.}, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge (working paper), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication-Files/11-052.pdf (Jan. 19, 2012) (concluding “financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC’s 2010 Rule.”).

Politically active corporations should be regulated in ways that mirror union regulations so that shareholders receive a greater opportunity to consent and increased transparency. Clearly there are structural differences among unions and corporations. Nonetheless, the principle ostensibly animating the Court’s intervention in *Knox* is a desire to protect the individual’s ability to support only those political causes that coincide with the individual’s belief system. Consequently, if union nonmembers should not be forced to subsidize speech with which they disagree, then shareholders should likewise not have to subsidize speech with which they disagree.

As Professor Victor Brudney noted, the fact that corporations can spend in politics “leaves to be solved the crucial questions of the state’s power to decide who, within the corporation, may authorize it to utter that speech . . . .” Shareholders cannot prevent wasteful corporate political spending under the current rules. As Professor John C. Coates IV concluded, “Contrary to the Supreme Court’s stated assumption, shareholders were not able to protect themselves from misuse of corporate funds for political purposes prior to *Citizens United*, and the risk of such misuse has increased as a result of the decision.” Yet the Court seemed willfully blind to the problem of shareholders’ subsidizing objectionable corporate and electing effective representatives to the board, should object to those shareholders occasionally electing a representative directly, and getting rid of directors who clearly do not have their best interests at heart.”

162. One structural difference could be the lack of state action in the shareholder context. However, as noted above, state action does not appear to be a dispositive barrier to imposing consent mechanisms in the private-sector union context. Bebchuk & Jackson, *supra* n. 30, at 114 (“[T]he union case and the public company case [are] distinguishable because participation may be required by law in the former but not the latter . . . . [b]ut the volitional nature of being a shareholder . . . . does not protect shareholders from the consequences of political speech they disfavor.”); Sachs, *supra* n. 72, at 829 (“conditioning economic opportunities on a political funding requirement is normatively problematic even in the absence of compulsion”—even if employees are not ‘compelled’ to work for union employers or shareholders are not ‘compelled’ to invest in the stock market . . . . ”).


165. Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Ins., and Govt. Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., *Hearing on Corporate Governance After Citizens United*, 111th Cong. 10–11 (Mar. 11, 2010) (Statement by Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Investors, “Left unchecked, management can contribute to favored candidates, causes, or charities that have no value to the company or even advocate positions contrary to shareholders’ best interests.”).

political speech at the same time they worked to protect union nonmembers from even temporarily funding union political speech.

I am, of course, not the only one to suggest that there is a logical chasm between how the Court treats corporations and unions that engage in politics. As Professor Reza Dibadj noted, “consider also that union members have greater rights than shareholders vis-à-vis unwanted political speech.”\textsuperscript{167} Indeed, Professors Charlotte Garden, Benjamin Sachs, Catherine L. Fisk, and Erwin Chemerinsky have all written compelling pieces on this phenomenon of the Court’s treating corporations with deference while micromanaging unions. These professors have argued that the Court and the legislatures they review should harmonize their approach to these two politically active groups, either by relaxing the requirements for unions as Professors Garden, Fisk, and Chemerinsky suggest or by requiring more of corporations as Professor Sachs suggests.\textsuperscript{168}

Professor Sachs notes the differential treatment of corporations’ and unions’ political speech in the following manner: “By imposing such substantive and administrative burdens on unions but not corporations, the current asymmetry treats political speakers differently. . . . [T]here may be no justification for this asymmetry.”\textsuperscript{169} Professor Sachs suggests that shareholders should have a right to opt out of corporate political spending:

Congress [ ] and state lawmakers [have a] conceptually sound justification for offering shareholders a right to opt out of financing corporate political activity. . . . [S]uch a reform could . . . involve a requirement that corporations offer shareholders the right to receive a dividend payment each year in an amount equal to the shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporate budget that was spent on politics.\textsuperscript{170}

Professor Sachs is not alone in suggesting this opt-out prescription post-
\textit{Citizens United}. Attorney Jeremy Mallory articulated in a recent law review article: “The most parsimonious solution would be to recognize that the principles articulated in the union-dues and segregated-funds cases apply to the corporate context, warranting a remedy such as a pre-emptive


\textsuperscript{167}. Dibadj, supra n. 126, at 467 (quoting \textit{Intl.
Assn. of Machinists}, 367 U.S. at 768–769 (“In \textit{International Association of Machinists v. Street}, the Supreme Court held that ‘§ 2, Eleventh [of the Railway Labor Act] is to be construed to deny the unions, over an employee’s objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes.’”)).

\textsuperscript{168}. See Garden, supra n. 68, at 41–44; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra n. 15; Sachs, supra n. 72, at 869.

\textsuperscript{169}. Sachs, supra n. 72, at 808.

\textsuperscript{170}. Id.
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opt-out by shareholders.”171 This solution has also been offered by Professor Jennifer S. Taub.172

While I agree with the basic premise of Professor Sachs’ analysis of the problem, here I am suggesting a slightly different solution. Professor Sachs suggests that shareholders should be able to opt out of corporate political spending to earn an extra mini-dividend.173 I argue that, akin to the right articulated for nonmembers of unions in Knox, shareholders should have the right to opt in to corporate political spending through a shareholder vote before a corporation spends in the political arena.174 And here I advocate for a vote on the annual proxy as the means through which shareholders could manifest their objection or consent to corporate political spending.175

X. THE U.K. EXPERIENCE WITH “OPT-IN” FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES

Models of how to structure shareholder consent are rare, as many countries simply ban corporate spending in elections.176 Yet the U.S. is not

172. Taub, supra n. 100, at 484 (“As an alternative, the statute might also permit investors across the intermediation chain to, like union members, be given the right to opt out of political spending.”).
174. Here my proposal for shareholder consent that I have written about in more detail elsewhere is most closely akin to that suggested by Professors Bebchuk and Jackson. Others have also suggested this reform as well. See e.g. Brian J. Robbins & Justin D. Rieger, Corporate Political Spending Post-Citizens United, Law360 Expert Analysis, available at http://www.robbinsarroyo.com/shareholders-rights-blog/robbins-umeda-attorneys-discuss-corporate-political-spending-in-law360/ (Sept. 28, 2011) (Arguing, “Such reform could be accomplished by ensuring that: (1) corporations obtain shareholder approval before making political expenditures; (2) shareholders define in advance how and when corporate funds can be used in the political arena; and/or (3) corporations disclose material information concerning their political spending decisions and the rationale behind those decisions to their stakeholders.”).
175. Annual shareholder proxy votes are a different mechanism than a Hudson notice followed by a Knox “opt-in,” but they represent the closest workable analog in the corporate law context. For a more fulsome explanation, see Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending & Shareholders’ Rights: Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach in Risk Management and Corporate Governance, supra n. 31, at 420 (“The reason I suggest the British model instead of a model where every individual expenditure is subject to a separate shareholder vote is a deep concern about administrability and transaction costs. A system that puts every political action of a corporation to a vote would be costly and unwieldy to administer. By contrast, under this proposal, the corporation can simply add an additional question (on the authorization of the political budget) to the list of items that are regularly subject to a shareholder vote at the annual meeting, alongside traditional matters like reelecting the board of directors or appointing auditors. This gives shareholders a say without making the whole process collapse under its own weight.”).
unique in allowing corporate political spending. The U.K. has allowed corporations to spend in Parliamentary elections, but the U.K. requires greater regulation of corporations that politick than the U.S. does presently. Shareholder protections are needed here just as they are needed in the U.K.\textsuperscript{177} Thus, the U.K. provides a functioning model for U.S. regulators to emulate.

In 2000 and 2006, the U.K. amended its Companies Act to require shareholder votes before public companies can spend in either U.K. or E.U. elections.\textsuperscript{178} Before the 2000 amendments to the U.K. Companies Act, corporate governance experts raised concerns about corporate managers in public companies spending other people’s money in U.K. elections. For example, Anne Simpson from the Pensions and Investment Research Consultants (“PIRC”) testified before a Parliamentary committee in 1998:

Our other main point is accountability. When the directors decide to make a corporate donation, that is made from shareholder funds. . . . In other words, the majority of shareholders in British companies are institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies who are investing on behalf of others—they are investing the public’s money by and large. We therefore think it is absolutely essential that the directors seek approval from shareholders for donations that they wish to make from shareholders’ funds.\textsuperscript{179}

A year later, Stephen Byers, the U.K. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, also showed concern about accountability when corporations spent in elections, writing, “In recent years there has been growing concern about directors’ accountability to shareholders in relation to political donations by companies. This concern is due in part to the scope for conflict between a director’s personal wishes or interests and his duty to the company.”\textsuperscript{180} Consequently, the Parliamentary Committee studying the matter of corporate spending in the U.K. recommended greater transparency and share-

\textsuperscript{177} Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812–813 (White, J., dissenting) (“There is an additional overriding interest related to the prevention of corporate domination which is substantially advanced by Massachusetts’ restrictions upon corporate contributions: assuring that shareholders are not compelled to support and financially further beliefs with which they disagree where, as is the case here, the issue involved does not materially affect the business property, or other affairs of the corporation. . . . Massachusetts has chosen to forbid corporate management from spending corporate funds in referenda elections absent some demonstrable effect of the issue on the economic life of the company. In short, corporate management may not use corporate monies to promote what does not further corporate affairs but what in the last analysis are the purely personal views of the management, individually or as a group.”).


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Parliament adopted both recommendations in the Companies Act’s 2000 Amendments, thereby increasing accountability by requiring shareholder votes before the corporation can spend money from general treasury funds for political purposes.182

A. How the U.K. Approach Might Translate in the American Corporate Context

The International Corporate Governance Network considers the U.K.’s approach to be a best practice.183 This group suggests: “Shareholders should be able to vote on a company’s political donations policy, preferably through a company-proposed resolution or, secondly, through a shareholder resolution. Shareholders should be able to vote on the maximum amount of company donations for political purposes. Shareholders also should be in a position to vote on material changes to the company’s donations policy.”184

Of course there is a risk that what works abroad could get lost in translation in the American context. But there are enormous similarities between U.K. and American corporate law, which make the importation of the U.K.’s methods a reasonable approach.185

The Shareholder Protection Act, which has been introduced by both houses of Congress, would import into the U.S. the U.K. approach of re-

181. Donations to Political Parties: The Neill Report’s Recommendations for Companies, PLC Magazine, http://plc.practicallaw.com/8-100-8765# (Nov. 1, 1998) (“The report recommends that a company intending to make a donation, whether in cash or in kind, and including any sponsorship, or loans or transactions at a favourable rate to a political party should obtain the prior authority of its shareholders. This authority could be in the form of a broad enabling power, valid for no longer than four years, and could typically be conferred by a resolution passed at the company’s annual general meeting giving the board of directors discretion about the making of such donations up to a prescribed limit.”).

182. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Shareholder Consent is Key in Political Spending, Brennan Center for Justice, http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/shareholder_consent_is_key_in_political_spending/ (Mar. 16, 2010); Richard Williams, Regulating Political Donations by Companies: Challenges and Misconceptions, 75 The Modern Law Review 951, 960 (Nov. 2012) (“In practice, though, the scope for self-interested conduct by directors will likely be much reduced by the [shareholder] authorisation rule, not least because directors have clear incentives to disclose the intended direction or purpose of donations, if not the intended recipients, at the time of authorisation. Perceived abuse of an authorisation resolution would reduce the chances of securing authorisation in the future and could even put directors’ positions on the board in jeopardy.”).


184. Id.

185. See Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. Corp. L. 59, 77–78 (2010) (“The United States and the U.K. share a common legal heritage and because their markets share important similarities—both have been historically characterized by a base of dispersed investors.”); see generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. Fin. 471 (1999) (explaining that the United States and the United Kingdom both demonstrate good shareholder protection and widely held medium-sized firms).
quiring shareholder consent for corporate political spending.\textsuperscript{186} The Act would change U.S. securities laws to require a shareholder vote to authorize an annual budget for political expenditures before the money is spent.\textsuperscript{187} This bill would empower a majority of shareholders to act to approve corporate political spending.\textsuperscript{188} In many ways this legislation is more modest than the rights now available in the union context, where dissenting non-members have been given primacy over the majority.

States have also explored the idea of adopting shareholder protection laws through an admixture of state corporate laws and election laws.\textsuperscript{189} Some states have required boards of directors to approve future political spending by corporate managers. Board approval for corporate political expenditures is required in three states: Missouri, Louisiana, and Iowa.\textsuperscript{190} Last year, Massachusetts introduced a bill that would require board approval before a company could engage in political expenditures.\textsuperscript{191} Connecticut’s legislature passed a similar bill, but it was vetoed by the governor.\textsuperscript{192} Board approval may offer a sensible middle ground between those who want exclusive manager control and those who want significant shareholder input.\textsuperscript{193}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{193} Roger Coffin, A Responsibility to Speak: Citizens United, Corporate Governance and Managing Risks, 8 Hastings Bus. L.J. 103, 166 (Winter 2012) (“[P]olicy makers, including judges, state corporate law and model codes, should clarify that the independent members of a board of directors who are subject to an open election process should have the responsibility to oversee corporate political speech
A state could change its laws to give shareholders improved transparency and consent regarding corporate political spending.¹⁹⁴ In the past two years, bills to this effect have been introduced in Maryland, New York, California, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Maine.¹⁹⁵ Maryland was the first state to adopt a law requiring that disclosures of corporate political spending be made directly to shareholders.¹⁹⁶

**B. Constitutionality of the U.K. Approach**

Since Congress and the states have yet to adopt requirements for shareholder votes on corporate political spending, there has not yet been a case or controversy for a court to adjudicate. However, there is language in *Citizens United* that gives the government the ability to protect shareholders. As Justice Kennedy wrote for an eight-person majority:¹⁹⁷

> Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy . . . can be more effective today because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative. . . . With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits. . . . [D]isclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴. Ronald J. Colombo, *The Corporation as a Tocquevillian Association*, 85 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 3 (Fall 2012) (“Although the U.S. Constitution might preclude Congress from restricting corporate speech, it does not necessarily preclude state governments from amending corporate law in a way that effectively restricts the ability of entities incorporated within their jurisdiction from exercising this right.” (internal citations omitted)).


¹⁹⁷. Eight Justices voted in favor of disclosure and disclaimers in both 2010’s *Citizens United* and 2003’s *McConnell*.

The language of *Citizens United* is clear that shareholders have the right to hold corporations accountable for their political spending. Accountability may include a U.K.-style shareholder authorization through an annual vote similar to the *Knox* requirement of an opt-in for unions.

Professors Bebchuk and Jackson intimate that legislation like the Shareholder Protection Act is constitutional under the First Amendment. Indeed their own proposed solution would require a supermajority shareholder vote before a company could spend in politics, which is an even more stringent requirement than the majority vote contemplated in the Shareholder Protection Act. Meanwhile Professors Robert Sprague and Mary Ellen Wells have criticized the Shareholder Protection Act as not going far enough because dissenting shareholders who lost a vote would still have to fund corporate political speech with which they disagreed. And Professor Brudney once even suggested unanimous shareholder votes could be required before a corporation could spend on politics.

C. Popular Support for Shareholder Consent

As a democracy, American voters can choose to modify U.S. laws to suit changed circumstances. Polling since *Citizens United* indicates that Americans would embrace requiring greater consent within corporations concerning the issue of corporate political expenditures. Indeed, Americans of all stripes have expressed their dismay with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Citizens United*. For example, a *Washington Post-ABC News* poll conducted right after the decision found “eight in 10 poll respondents...

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201. *Id.* (suggesting that a requirement of up to four-fifths would probably pass constitutional muster).

202. Sprague & Wells, *supra* n. 16, at 554 ("Neither bill addresses dissenting shareholders who, like all shareholders under current law, may be forced into being associated with speech they may not support.").

203. Brudney, *supra* n. 163, at 241 (Writing in reaction to the *Bellotti* decision, *Citizens United*’s precursor: "While other provisions of the Constitution may limit the government’s power to prescribe the allocation of decision making authority, the restrictions on government power contained in the First Amendment do not address, or without more inhibit, the government’s power to determine whether corporate decisions should be made by officers or directors without even consulting stockholders, only by stockholders, or only by supermajority or unanimous vote of stockholders.").

say they oppose the high court’s Jan. 21 decision to allow unfettered corporate political spending, with 65 percent ‘strongly’ opposed.”

The American public also wants better corporate controls in light of *Citizens United*. Another poll from February 2010 found a “majority of voters strongly favor both requiring corporations to get shareholder approval for political spending (56 percent strongly favor, 80 percent total favor) and a ban on political spending by foreign corporations (51 percent strongly favor, 60 percent total favor).”

Polling in 2012 shows little has changed in the intervening two years. Democracy Corps found in November 2012:

Two thirds (64 percent) of 2012 voters said that democracy was undermined in this election by big donors and secret money that control which candidates we hear about. . . . Voters give strong support across the board to a series of reforms like closing the revolving door (81%), [and] increased disclosure of outside money (85%).

The 2012 polling has shown how frustrated American voters are with corporate money in politics. Nearly nine in ten Americans agree that there is too much corporate money in politics according to a poll released by Bannon Communications on behalf of the Corporate Reform Coalition in late October 2012. This poll also found overwhelming support for corporate governance reforms in light of *Citizens United*. According to the poll, 81 percent of Americans agree that companies should only spend money on political campaigns if they disclose their spending immediately. This poll also found that more than seven out of ten Americans (71%) favor a requirement that a company’s shareholders approve all corporate political spending before the money is spent. These polls conclusively show that a strong majority of the American public supports responding to *Citizens United* by improving corporate governance to protect shareholders.

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XI. Conclusion

When a billionaire spends his own money in an expensive election like the $7 billion federal election in 2012, such spending may be wasteful vanity, but at least the money is his to squander. As this piece has explored, more difficult questions arise when the heads of organizations spend money belonging to others for political purposes. This phenomenon has arisen in at least two contexts in American elections: in unions, where dues are utilized, and in public corporations, where investor money is used for electioneering. The issue of prior consent for this type of political spending has become pressing now that *Citizens United* has expanded the ability of organizations like corporations and unions to electioneer.

Our nation has struggled with regulating money in politics for centuries. In the normal course of events, the political branches, the 50 states, or voters choose the contours of such regulations. *Knox* is remarkable because it makes the Supreme Court the source of a national paycheck protection rationale, at least in the case of special assessments for public-sector unions. But *Knox* raises the intriguing possibility that a future Supreme Court (instead of a state legislature or Congress) could impose a shareholder consent rule. In the meantime, the onus is on state legislatures, Congress, administrative agencies, and American voters to bring corporate po-

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210. The amount of money spent in elections is of concern. See Senator Tom Udall, *Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform*, 29 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 235, 235 (Fall 2010) (“This is the real danger of unrestricted campaign expenditures—that elected officials legislate on behalf of corporations, unions, and other powerful organizations instead of their constituents.”); see also Robert F. Bauer, *Appraising Citizens United*, prepared for a conference at the Cato Institute, http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/bauer-cato.pdf (Jan. 23, 2012) (“[I]n the time of billion dollar Presidential campaigns and multi-million dollar Congressional campaigns, the question of campaign expense as a public policy concern might have received more attention in the Court’s [*Citizens United*] analysis. In the field of campaign finance, cost is the ground from which spring all other issues of consequence.”).


212. Bebchuk & Jackson, *supra* n. 30, at 84–85 (“[L]awmakers should develop special rules to govern who may make political speech decisions on behalf of corporations’ and “[t]he expansion of the scope of constitutionally protected corporate political speech brought about by *Citizens United*, however, makes the need for such rules all the more pressing.”).

213. See e.g. Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill 27 (N.Y. Sup. 1843) (Supreme Court of New York discussing an 1829 New York State law concluding, “The legislature evidently thought that the most effectual way ‘to preserve the purity of election,’ was to keep them free from the contaminating influence of money. . . . The legislature have [sic] said that the thing shall not be done, and that is enough.”); *Financing Presidential Campaigns: Report of the President’s Commission on Campaign Costs* at 2 (President’s Commission 1962) (reporting to President Kennedy on the “rocketing costs of Presidential campaigns, and the recurring difficulties parties encounter in meeting those costs”).
litical spending rules in line with union political spending rules. If unions must jump through hoops to exercise their political rights, then corporations should too.214
